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Jennifer Leitch*  A Less Private Practice: Government
 Lawyers and Legal Ethics
Government lawyers are public servants and legal professionals. How they differ 
from private lawyers has much to do with whom they purport to represent and 
how they exercise power as a lawyer. I will look at a particular case-study—the St. 
Anne’s Residential school adjudication. This case study illustrates the challenges 
that government lawyers face in ful lling their professional duty within a traditional 
private lawyer framework. St. Anne’s Residential School involved some of the 
most egregious physical, sexual and psychological abuse of Indigenous children 
between 1941 and 1972. St. Anne’s Residential School litigation is used as a 
cautionary (and truly tragic) tale regarding the problems associated with applying 
a private lawyer model of professional ethics to government lawyers acting in a 
particular adversarial context. This paper will canvass some of the more serious 
problems that arose in respect of the St. Anne’s IAP litigation and provide an 
important lens through which to examine a different approach to government 
lawyering that engages some suggestions for developing an ethical approach 
that better suits the responsibilities and challenges of government lawyers. Such 
suggestions engage a justice-seeking ethic that is cognizant of the powerful role 
that government lawyers play in our legal system and one that is more consistent 
with meaningful reconciliation. 
Les avocats du gouvernement sont des fonctionnaires et des professionnels du 
droit. Ce qui les différencie des avocats en pratique privée tient en bonne partie aux 
personnes qu’ils prétendent représenter et la façon dont ils exercent leur pouvoir 
en tant qu’avocat. J’examinerai une étude de cas particulière : la décision dans 
l’affaire du pensionnat Sainte-Anne. Cette étude de cas illustre les dé s que les 
avocats du gouvernement doivent relever pour remplir leur devoir professionnel 
dans un cadre traditionnel d’avocat en pratique privée. Le pensionnat St. Anne a été 
le théâtre de certains des plus graves abus physiques, sexuels et psychologiques 
commis à l’encontre d’enfants autochtones dans le système des pensionnats entre 
1941 et 1972. L’affaire du pensionnat Ste-Anne sert d’avertissement (et constitue 
un récit vraiment tragique) concernant les problèmes associés à l’application d’un 
modèle d’éthique professionnelle s’appliquant aux avocats en pratique privée aux 
avocats du gouvernement agissant dans un contexte accusatoire particulier. Dans 
le présent article, nous examinons certains des problèmes les plus graves qui sont 
survenus lors de l’audience du processus d’évaluation indépendant (PEI) relatif 
au litige du pensionnat Ste-Anne, et nous présentons une nouvelle optique pour 
l’exercice de la profession d’avocat au sein du gouvernement. Nous formulons 
quelques suggestions pour développer une approche éthique mieux adaptée aux 
responsabilités et aux dé s des avocats du gouvernement. De telles suggestions 
engagent une éthique de la recherche de la justice qui tient compte du rôle puissant 
que les avocats du gouvernement jouent dans notre système juridique et qui est 
plus cohérente avec une réelle réconciliation.
* Jennifer Leitch was a visiting professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, an adjunct Instructor 
at Trinity College, University of Toronto and a Senior Research Fellow at the Canadian Forum on 
Civil Justice, Osgoode Hall Law School. I would like to thank Allan Hutchinson, Richard Devlin and 
David Schulze for taking the time to review this paper and for their thoughtful contributions to its 
development.
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Introduction
It is accepted wisdom that government lawyers are a special kind of 
lawyer. They operate in a different context to private lawyers: they are 
public servants as well as legal professionals. As such, it seems odd that 
they would be governed by the same set of professional expectations and 
ethical duties as private lawyers. At the very least, it might be thought 
that there would be a sub-category of rules and regulations that would 
canvass and account for the differences between the professional contexts 
of government lawyers and private lawyers. Although most commentators 
take for granted that these differences should warrant a different approach, 
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it remains the case that government lawyers are lumped in with private 
lawyers when it comes to the application of ethical rules. This presents 
challenges among government lawyers and beyond the sphere of 
government lawyers when setting expectations and assessing conduct.1
It is a perplexing situation. Not surprisingly, it results in anomalies and 
confusion in determining what government lawyers should do by way of 
ethical conduct and professional propriety.
In this paper, I want to explore these anomalous situations and dispel 
some of the confusion that surrounds the ethical roles of government 
lawyers. After introducing some of the important notions that in uence 
and frame the work of government lawyers, I look at a particular case-
study—the St. Anne’s Residential school settlement adjudication. It 
illustrates and exempli es the challenges and troubling manifestations 
that government lawyers face in ful lling their professional and public 
duties within a traditional and private lawyer framework. My focus is not 
only the inadequacy of an approach that treats government lawyers the 
same as private lawyers, but also the practical problems and pitfalls that 
this creates for government lawyers in ful lling their ethical duties and 
professional responsibilities. However, there is little point in being merely 
critical in focus; these failings have already been amply documented.2
Instead, I advance a series of proposals and suggestions for how to develop 
an ethical and professional imperative that is better suited to the particular 
context and challenges of government lawyering. These proposals and 
suggestions are grounded in a ‘justice’ ethic; an ethic that already serves 
to inform certain government lawyers’ practice. As such, my ambition is 
to utilize a critical approach to lay the foundations for a more constructive 
proposal that might be examined and expanded going forward.
Part I canvasses and critically examines the modes of professional 
regulation that infuses the government lawyer’s practice and conduct 
including the provincial and territorial codes of conduct, the Prosecutorial 
1. Elizabeth Sanderson, Government Lawyering-Duties and Ethical Challenges of Government 
Lawyers (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2018) at xxvii.
2. Brent Cotter, “The Legal Accountability of Governments and Politicians: A Re ection Upon 
Their Roles and Responsibilities” (2008) 2 JPPL 63 [Cotter, “Legal Accountability”]; Brent Cotter, 
“The Evolving ‘Public Interest’ Dimensions of Professional Ethics for Lawyers” (2007) 13:2 
Canterbury L Rev 155 [Cotter, “Evolving ‘Public Interest’”]; Adam M Dodek, “Lawyering at the 
Intersection of Public Law and Legal Ethics: Government Lawyers as Custodians of the Rule of 
Law” (2010) 33:1 Dal LJ 1; Allan C Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 2nd 
ed (Toronto: Irwin, 2006); Abbe Smith, “Can you be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?” (2001) 
14:2 Geo J Leg Ethics 355; Lauren Soubise & Alice Woolley, “Prosecutors and Justice: Insights from 
Comparative Analysis” (2018) Fordham Int’l L J [forthcoming], online: Social Science Research 
Network <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3175587> [perma.cc/56XA-CD24]; John 
Mark Keyes, “Loyalty, Legality and Public Sector Lawyers” (2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 129.
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Deskbook, the rule of law and the public interest. Part II introduces the St. 
Anne’s Residential School litigation and more particularly, the disclosure 
and related challenges as well as incomplete narratives that occurred 
in respect of the independent assessment process involving St. Anne’s. 
Included in this section is a survey of the government lawyers’ positions 
respecting certain of these issues and a critique of those positions. The  nal 
section of this paper—Part III—proposes a new direction for government 
lawyers in the form of a justice-seeking ethic and in so doing, highlights 
as well as responds to the critiques of such an ethic. Important to this 
discussion is how such a new ethical approach would be operationalized.
I. Government lawyers and professional codes of conduct 
Two thousand six hundred lawyers employed by the government of 
Canada comprise the Federal Crown Counsel. These lawyers work for the 
Department of Justice, the Public Prosecution Service of Canada as well 
as provide in-house legal services to various government departments, 
federal agencies, and tribunals.3 They are public servants practicing law in 
the service of the Crown.4 Additionally, across the provinces, there are a 
myriad of lawyers working in similar capacities at the provincial level for 
the provincial attorney general as well as other provincial governmental 
departments. Considering the general context of litigation and litigation-
related work, the various government departments (and, in certain cases, 
Cabinet) generally act as instructing clients to government lawyers. A vast 
number of these government lawyers function essentially as litigation 
counsel working on behalf of a government department or agency. In so 
doing, they “consult with their clients [the various departments], give them 
legal advice and receive instructions from those clients on the approaches 
and positions to be taken in litigation.”5 This work encompasses a broad 
spectrum of civil litigation topics. Moreover, part of the mandate of the 
federal as well as the provincial attorney-generals is to manage the legal 
affairs of the various government departments and agencies by providing 
advice as well as conducting litigation on behalf of those various 
departments, agencies and tribunals. For the purposes of the discussion 
in this paper, the term government lawyers contemplates those lawyers 
3. See “Association of Justice Counsel (AJC-AJJ)” (last updated 11 September 2019), online: 
Association of Justice Counsel <ajc-ajj.net/> [perma.cc/5TTY-78J4].
4. Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxiii.
5. Attorney General of Canada, The Attorney General of Canada’s Directive on Civil Litigation 
Involving Indigenous Peoples (Ottawa: The Attorney General of Canada, 2019) at 5, online (pdf): 
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ijr-dja/dclip-dlcpa/litigation-litiges.pdf> [perma.cc/N2XE-BP57] 
[Litigation Directive].
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employed by the Department of Justice, the provincial counterparts as 
well as those representing a particular government department.6
Across Canada, the provincial and territorial law societies are 
responsible for governing the lawyers permitted to practice within that 
province and do so through the Rules of Professional Conduct. This applies 
in respect of the federal as well as provincial and territorial government 
lawyers located in a particular provincial jurisdiction. In addition, recent 
iterations of the Model Code of Professional Conduct generated by the 
Federation of Law Societies recommend the standards generally expected 
of lawyers across the country and are, in many respects, consistent with 
the provincial codes.7 This is a consideration that is particularly relevant in 
the context of federal government lawyers who may be situated in different 
jurisdictions throughout Canada. In accordance with these professional 
codes of conduct, much of the private lawyer’s professional duties and 
responsibilities  ow from and are de ned in terms of their engagement 
with clients within the adversarial framework. Private lawyers operate on 
the basis of an ‘enlightened self-interest’ in the sense that serving their 
client’s interests will ultimately serve their professional self-interests. In 
many respects, the adversarial context has fostered a singular commitment 
to the primary furtherance of the client’s interests. Correspondingly, this 
singular commitment to the client’s interests (to the relative exclusion 
of most other interests) is re ected in the dominant ‘zealous advocate’ 
approach to lawyering that permeates legal ethics. This model tends to 
inform much of the professional codes of conduct that regulate all lawyers 
as well the courts’ interpretation of lawyers’ duties and responsibilities.8 
Moreover, the professional culture of lawyers re ects a continued 
adherence to the neutral partisanship model of lawyering that is consistent 
with notions of the zealous advocate.
However, this approach to legal ethics is not without its challenges. 
The adversarial framework tends to perpetuate a hierarchy of duties and 
responsibilities that places zealous advocacy and client autonomy at its peak. 
In keeping with these notions of client autonomy and zealous advocacy, the 
adversarial framework encourages and, in many circumstances, requires 
that lawyers conduct themselves in certain ways. This conception of the 
lawyer’s role assumes the lawyer to be ‘neutral’ vis-à-vis the morality of 
6. Sanderson, supra note 1 at xxiii.
7. Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, (amended 
19 October 2019), online (pdf): < sc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.
pdf> [https://perma.cc/Q5VU-TJCP].
8. See e.g., Law Society of Ontario, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.2; See also Groia v The 
Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27.
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their client’s views or actions. While this is not the only conceptualization 
of the lawyer’s ethical role and other approaches exist,9 this traditional 
model of professionalism does tend to inform current discourse on legal 
ethics.10 However, these expectations raise concerns about the ethical 
appropriateness of the lawyer’s ability to distance themselves not only from 
the morality of a client’s position, but also from the actions taken on the 
client’s behalf. “To the extent that lawyers are not ethically accountable for 
the client’s objectives or the means used to achieve those objectives, there 
is little incentive to engage in a contemplative analysis of the steps they 
take in the client’s name.”11 The result is the creation of an environment in 
which lawyers are incentivized to exploit any advantage the system allows 
on behalf of their client.12 The further consequence is a marginalization 
of the lawyers’ competing duties to the legal system and the public. Such 
considerations are often rationalized in the criminal defence context when 
the lawyer, in acting for an accused, must take certain steps (like cross-
examinations that discredit adversarial witnesses) in order to serve her 
client’s best interests.13 
In an adversarial system, neutral partisanship is more often than not 
used to justify behaviour that is unnecessary for lawyers to do their jobs: 
behaviour such as the adoption of unreasonable or unsound positions or 
use of tactics that obfuscate the process to a party’s advantage. Moreover, 
the adversarial system, “expects parties to be sel sh in their arguments, 
creates incentives to hide evidence, and rewards parties whose attorneys 
are the most skilled and well-funded.”14 Thus, the debate about the scope 
and appropriateness of this framework as the underpinning of lawyers’ 
professional conduct is more often than not examined in a legal context that, 
in theory, pits individual private parties against the state or alternatively, 
private parties against each other. In these contexts, the question of legal 
9. For an alternative approach, see Trevor CW Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 51; Deborah L Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10. For a very recent reference to the zealous advocate approach to lawyering (particularly in the 
government lawyering context) see Andrew Flavelle Martin & Candice Telfer, “The Impact of the 
Honour of the Crown on the Ethical Obligations of Government Lawyers: A Duty of Honourable 
Dealing” (2018) 41:2 Dal LJ 443 at 446.
11. Jennifer Leitch, “Lawyers and Self-Represented Litigants: An Ethical Change of Role” (2017) 
95:3 Can Bar Rev at 677.
12. C Sampford & C Condlln, “Educating Lawyers for Changing Process” in Charles Sampford, 
Sophie Blencowe & Suzanne Condlln, eds, Educating Lawyers for a Less Adversarial System (Sydney: 
Australia, The Federation Press, 1999) 173 at 178.
13. Elaine Craig, “The Ethical Identity of Sexual Assault Lawyers” (2017) 41:1 Ottawa LR 77 at 86.
14. Sandra Buhai, “Access to Justice for the Unrepresented Litigants” (2009) 42:4 Loy LA L Rev 
979 at 982.
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ethics is limited to considering how the lawyers have conducted themselves 
in the contest between the two private autonomous parties or as against the 
state by its legal representatives. This approach to legal ethics often fails to 
analyze conduct on behalf of the state. In this setting, each party assumes 
responsibility for the handling of their case guided largely by self-interest 
in maximizing their position. 
The zealous advocate model is particularly problematic in the 
context of government lawyers where the government entity ‘writ large’ 
is representational of a variety of legitimate and often competing public 
interests as opposed to the private law model of one client with singular 
interests.15 As a consequence of this dilemma, there is an argument that 
government lawyers should not act as private law lawyers committed to 
representing an individual client’s interests when addressing the legitimate 
claims of citizens made against government.16 
Historically, by contrast to private lawyers, government lawyers’ 
unique responsibilities and duties are “under-theorized in academic 
scholarship.”17 However, it is noted that in recent years, there has been 
an uptake in the scholarship around the particular ethical and professional 
responsibilities of government lawyers; some of which is canvassed in 
this paper. Given the government lawyer’s unique relationship as both a 
lawyer acting on behalf of her public client, and an employee and public 
servant acting on behalf of her governmental employer, an unfettered 
loyalty grounded in notions of client autonomy and zealous advocacy can 
obfuscate the government lawyer’s professional duties. Nowhere is this 
more problematic than in the context of government litigation involving 
Indigenous groups. For example, an unfettered loyalty to zealous advocacy 
and neutral partisanship might well undermine the Honour of the Crown,18
and the corresponding broader objectives of the elected government, 
including reconciliation. In fact, a pronouncement from the Canadian 
Supreme Court speci cally highlighted the signi cance of the Honour of 
15. Government lawyers are not the only sub-set of lawyers that may face varied and competing 
interests. Another example in this regard are in-house counsel who may need to take account of 
senior management’s interests, the interests of the corporate board and the corporate entity itself. See 
Hutchinson, supra note 2 at 183-186.
16. Stephen K Berenson, “Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should and Will Government 
Lawyers Serve the Public Interest” (2000) 41 BCL Rev 789; Cotter, “Legal Accountability,” supra
note 2.
17. Dodek, supra note 2 at 4. See also Michael H Morris & Sandra Nishikawa, “The Orphans of 
Legal Ethics: Why government lawyers are different—and how we protect and promote that difference 
in service of the rule of law and public interest” (2013) 26 CJALP 171.
18. See Mitchell v Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 SCR 85 at 131, 71 DLR (4th) 193; R v Badger, 
[1996] 1 SCR 771, 133 DLR (4th) 324; Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forest), 2004 
SCC 73; Manitoba Metis Federation Inc v Canada (AG), 2013 SCC 14.
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the Crown to meaningful reconciliation with First Nations.19 The Honour 
of the Crown extends to the government, its departments, agencies and 
of cials in respect of its interactions with Indigenous peoples and requires 
that all of cials “act with honour, integrity, good faith and fairness in all 
its dealings with Indigenous [P]eoples.”20 In interpreting the scope of 
this requirement, at least one court has suggested that the Honour of the 
Crown also extends to those representing the Crown, namely government 
lawyers.21 Additionally, Andrew Martin has considered the need for a 
special ethical obligation of honourable dealing when a government 
lawyer is acting as the ‘face’ of the Crown in negotiations with Indigenous 
groups.22 While this is an important discussion respecting government 
lawyers’ ethical obligations in the particular context of negotiation, the 
question that follows is what such a duty might look like in the context 
of government lawyers engaged in litigation such as the residential 
school litigation. This issue is particularly acute if it is meant to inform 
the professional duties of government lawyers acting in cases involving 
Indigenous People. 23
In light of this obligation, when taking instructions from and acting on 
behalf of a particular government body, the Department of Justice lawyer 
cannot and should not simply adopt a neutral partisan or ‘hired gun’ 
mentality that calls upon her to act as a zealous advocate and maintain 
a largely unfettered duty of loyalty to the instructing client. While this 
position informs much of the discussion in this paper, it is important to 
note that others have an entirely different approach to the duty of loyalty 
owed by government lawyers to their clients as zealous advocates.24
A recent directive of former Attorney General Jody Wilson-Raybould 
speaks directly to the dilemma of how government lawyers should act 
19. See Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 
SCC 74. Former Chief Justice McLachlin stated that, “[i]n all its dealings with Aboriginal Peoples, 
the Crown must act honourably, in accordance with its historical and future relationship with the 
Aboriginal Peoples in question. The Crown’s honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but 
must be given full effect in order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1)” (ibid 
at para 24).
20. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 202; See also Canada, Department of Justice “Principles respecting 
the Government of Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples” (14 February 2018), online: 
<www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/principles-principes.html> [perma.cc/3WE6-T94S] [Principles]; 
Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Government of Canada Sets a Principled Foundation 
for Advancing Renewed Relationships with Indigenous Peoples based on the Recognition of Rights” 
(14 July 2017), online: <www.canada.ca/en/department-justice/news/2017/07/government_of_
canadasetsaprincipledfoundationforadvancingrenewed.html> [perma.cc/S898-733F].
21. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 202; See also Joseph v Canada, 2008 FC 574.
22. Martin & Telfer, supra note 10.
23. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 203.
24. Keyes, supra note 2.
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in litigation, particularly in cases involving Indigenous groups and in 
the light of the objectives of reconciliation.25 Recognizing that a change 
was needed in respect of how the Canadian government engaged with 
Indigenous groups in the context of section 35 of the Constitution, the 
government of Canada prepared the Principles respecting the Government 
of Canada’s Relationship with Indigenous Peoples. In accordance with 
these principles, former Attorney General Wilson-Raybould sought to 
more particularly articulate an approach to litigation that underscores 
and furthers the objectives as outlined in the Principles. The directive 
created in this regard seeks to advance an approach to litigation that 
promotes resolution and settlement; pursue opportunities to narrow or 
avoid litigation (while still recognizing that litigation may be needed in 
certain instances as a means for Indigenous groups to assert a claim to 
certain rights or entitlements); and ensure that the practice of litigation 
between the government and Indigenous People is respectful of the 
special relationship between the Crown and Indigenous Peoples. This last 
consideration is meant to infuse Crown decisions about legal positions 
taken, the language used in expressing those positions and the procedures 
adopted to further those positions. For example, the directive suggests 
that the government of Canada’s approach to litigation should be to assist 
the court “constructively, expeditiously and effectively” when addressing 
Indigenous claims.26 This suggests an approach that is less adversarial 
in nature and, by contrast, more facilitative and more in keeping with 
a robust commitment to the Honour of the Crown. However, despite 
its good intentions, it is questionable whether this directive provides 
suf cient guidance or clout, particularly when it is contrasted with 
entrenched notions of professionalism as traditionally understood within 
the adversarial context. While it is acknowledged that this directive was 
not in force during much of the IAP at St. Anne’s, it remains to be seen 
what effect this directive will have on government lawyers. Moreover, as 
a directive, there is also a question about the force of its command as well 
as applicability to future governments. 
Notions of client autonomy and zealous advocacy are further 
complicated in the context of government lawyers when the fact that the 
client is also the lawyer’s employer is taken into account. In the private law 
context, the ultimate fallback position for a lawyer when confronted with 
25. Litigation Directive, supra note 5. This directive sought to outline an approach to litigation 
engaging section 35 of the Constitution by the attorney general of Canada and her representatives that 
is consistent with the Principles, supra note 20.
26. Litigation Directive, supra note 5.
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instructions from a client that run contrary to her ethical responsibilities 
is withdrawal from the case. While there are some limitations placed on 
this option under the Rules of Professional Conduct, generally speaking a 
private lawyer can decline to continue to act for a client (or take a particular 
client in the  rst place), if that client requests that the lawyer act in what 
the lawyer believes to be an unethical way. There are, of course, potentially 
negative consequences associated with withdrawing from a case. But, in 
theory, it is not likely to end a lawyer’s private practice, putting aside the 
in-house corporate counsel and the lawyer whose practice is limited to 
one large institutional client.27 The same may not be said of government 
lawyers within the Department of Justice. 
To the extent that they are instructed to take a particular position 
or conduct a case in a particular fashion, there is likely no ‘walk away’ 
position for that government lawyer, short of resignation. In this manner, 
government lawyers can be compared to junior associates in large law 
 rms, with little control over the  les they are assigned and the management 
of those  les.28 This is also similar to the position of in-house counsel 
who are essentially employed by the client they represent. In such legal 
contexts, the lawyer’s decision not to follow instructions from the client 
may precipitate their resignation.29 Where the only client a lawyer has is 
also their employer, it is not practically feasible to suggest that the lawyer 
will simply withdraw from the case. In fact, the only option available 
to that government lawyer may be resignation. However, practically 
speaking, this seems an untenable position for many government lawyers. 
Therefore, any development of ‘government-speci c’ legal ethics must 
take account of this speci c tension and, in so doing, create a space for the 
government lawyer to adopt an ethical position that is different than her 
employer. Such a development would avoid the problems such as those 
27. Robert K Vischer, “Legal Advice as Moral Perspective” (2005) University of St Thomas School 
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No 05-03, online: Social Sciences Research Network <papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=771006> [perma.cc/3B5G-ZSL6]. See also Keyes, supra note 
2 at 138 in which Keyes suggests that if a public sector lawyer believes that the client is engaged 
in wrongdoing, advises the client of same and the client persists, the lawyer must withdraw which, 
effectively in the governmental context, would likely expose the lawyer to disciplinary action and 
termination or resignation.
28. Allan C Hutchinson, “In the Public Interest: The Responsibilities and Rights of Government 
Lawyers” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 105 at 114.
29. Hutchinson, supra note 2 at 187-188.
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faced by Edgar Schmidt and, most recently, Jody Wilson-Raybould.30 In 
both cases, the lawyers ultimately had no choice other than to resign (or be 
terminated) when faced with political pressure or policies that ran contrary 
to the individual lawyer’s view of their ethical and professional duties as 
lawyers employed by the government.
1. Additional professional regulation of government lawyers
Recognizing some of the limits of the existing rules of professional conduct 
and their general inapplicability to the particular practice of government 
lawyers, it is important to take brief account of the various sources of 
professional guidance for government lawyers—Public Prosecution 
Service of Canada Deskbook, the rule of law, the public interest, and the 
pursuit of justice.
a. The Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook
Federal crown prosecutors (and the private sector agents acting on behalf 
of the Crown) are regulated by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada 
Deskbook.31 The Deskbook seeks to provide speci c rules and guidelines 
for prosecutors engaged in criminal prosecutions. The manual represents 
the acknowledgement of, and need for, speci c rules that will guide 
government lawyers in conducting certain types of litigation. 
Generally speaking, the Deskbook requires that prosecutors exercise 
decision-making independent of the interests of the sitting government. 
Underlying this independence is the concern that the prosecutorial branch 
not be used as a tool of the government of the day to affect certain political 
outcomes. Rather, the prosecutors remain accountable to the public in 
respect of the decision-making they undertake. The recent controversy 
respecting Prime Minister Trudeau and the allegation that he and/or senior 
members of his staff unduly pressured the Attorney General Wilson-
30. Edgar Schmidt had been employed as general counsel in the legislative services branch of the 
Department of Justice and during the course of his employment, he had sought a declaration that the 
minister of justice was “not complying with his statutory duty to report to the House of Commons 
on the inconsistency of government bills and regulations with the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (the “Charter”) and the Canadian Bill of Rights (the “Bill of Rights”).” (Keyes, supra note 2 
at 131); See also Simon Fodden, “Documents in the Edgar Schmidt Whistleblower Case” (23 January 
2013), online: SLAW <www.slaw.ca/2013/01/23/documents-in-the-Edgar-Schmidt-whistleblower-
case> [perma.cc/25G5-QJDZ]. The case of Jody Wilson-Raybould will be discussed in further detail 
later in this paper. 
31. Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Public Prosecution Service of Canada Deskbook (Ottawa: 
Attorney General of Canada, 2014), online: <www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/index.html> 
[perma.cc/8QQC-C2C2] [Deskbook].
326 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Raybould speaks directly to this concern.32 It is alleged that the Prime 
Minister sought to pressure the Attorney General not to prosecute a large 
company based in Quebec. The company facing possible prosecution had 
insinuated that it would leave Quebec if prosecuted; this would result in 
the termination of thousands of jobs within the province. The political 
fallout from such a departure could prove harmful to the government’s 
standing in Quebec in an election year. In this regard, the allegations and 
resulting resignation of the Attorney General cast a direct light on one of 
the concerns sought to be addressed by the Deskbook. 
Interestingly, the preface to the Deskbook notes that the guide is a 
“permanent work in progress whereby federal prosecutors are cognizant 
of the need for reform when policies become outdated or unclear.”33 The 
recent allegations of political pressure reinforce ongoing critiques about 
the Deskbook that include questions about how the rules are interpreted 
and enforced internally within government. Also, it needs to be asked what 
assistance the Deskbook might provide individual government lawyers 
(and even the Attorney General herself) when confronted with ethical 
dilemmas that are particular to the context of government lawyering. In 
the Wilson-Raybould context, it would seem that despite the existence of 
the Deskbook and professional rules of conduct, the Attorney General was 
left with few options. 
b. The rule of law
In addition to being guided by professional rules of conduct and the 
guidelines set out in the Deskbook, there are additional principles that 
are intended to guide government lawyers’ professional duties. Relevant 
to the discussion in this paper, these are respect for the rule of law and 
the responsibility to act in the public interest. As regards those duties 
that might be imposed on government lawyers in respect of their duty 
to promote the rule of law, it is worth noting Justice Laskin’s comments 
in in Henco Industries Ltd v Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy 
Council. He noted that the rule of law has a variety of different aspects that 
include, among other things, “respect for minority rights, reconciliation 
of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests through negotiation, fair 
procedural safeguards for those subject to criminal proceedings, respect 
32. “Timeline: The SNC Lavalin Controversy and Jody Wilson-Raybould,” Bloomberg (25 March 
2019), online: <www.bnnbloomberg.ca/timeline-the-snc-lavalin-controversy-and-jody-wilson-
raybould-1.1221040> [perma.cc/29DP-TT3L].
33. Deskbook, supra note 31.
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for Crown and police discretion….”34 Important within this articulation 
is that the existence of different and potentially competing dimensions of 
the rule of law in a given situation will require that those tasked with 
upholding the rule of law adopt a more nuanced evaluation of how the rule 
of law is to be accounted for in a particular circumstance. Adding further 
complexity to an already contextualized analysis is the notion that, “the 
rule of law does not require a decision-maker to act simply because a rule 
of law would permit it.”35 Notwithstanding an expanded notion of the rule 
of law as contemplated by Justice Laskin, the rule of law, as a source of 
professional or ethical guidance for government lawyers, is more likely 
to operate like a guiding principle rather than a standard of professional 
conduct against which a particular government lawyer would be able to 
measure or assess their own conduct.36 In other words, as a principle, the 
rule of law may signal that government action is subject to review and 
accountability but not necessarily how government lawyers are to conduct 
themselves in the context of those reviews. 
c. The public interest 
Regarding the public interest, the scope and weight of the government 
lawyer’s public interest duties remain a contested topic. Interestingly, 
the private law context also struggles with a debate over the scope of 
the private lawyer’s public interest duty. At the core of many of these 
debates (in both spheres) is the dif culty associated with de ning the 
‘public interest’ in a particular legal context. At best, this is a challenge 
and at worst, it results in reliance on interests that might run contrary 
to the public interest. For example, in the private law context, zealous 
advocacy may be argued to be in the public interest because it works to 
ensure that clients receive the best representation possible. However, the 
consequence of de ning the public interest in this manner is that there 
are few limits placed on the conduct of the zealous advocate. Within the 
context of the government lawyer’s public interest duty is the question 
of “the role and responsibilities that government lawyers do and should 
have in explicating or contributing to the government’s duty to act in 
the public interest.”37 Complicating this further for government lawyers 
is the situation where the government lawyer disagrees with the de ned 
public interest as articulated by their client (and elected of cial). In such 
34. Henco Industries Ltd v Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council, [2006] OJ No 4790 at 
paras 142-143, 82 OR (3d) 721 (ONCA).
35. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 90.
36. Dodek, supra note 2.
37. Hutchinson, supra note 28 at 116.
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circumstances, it would be dif cult to see how the government lawyer’s 
professional conception of the public interest would be reconciled with 
competing conceptions proffered by the elected of cials who claim to be 
re ecting the populaces’ will. Thus, for government lawyers relying on 
a public interest ethic raises two fundamental challenges; a challenge of 
de nition and a challenge associated with applying the public interest in a 
complex political context (and in a way that may run contrary to the public 
interest identi ed by the client-governmental department). Attempting 
to provide some clarity respecting the government lawyer’s public law 
duties, Elizabeth Sanderson draws on the various historical and statutory 
frameworks that in uence the scope of these duties. She de nes the public 
interest as:
something of importance to the public as a whole rather than just to 
a private individual. It can include many factors and cover matters 
as diverse as public morality, judicial economy,  scal responsibility, 
management of contingent liability, and the search for justice and a just 
result.38 
As can be gleaned from such a de nition, in any given circumstance, 
what constitutes the ‘public interest’ for a government lawyer may include 
a broad range of interests that shift in focus and strength depending on 
the particular political and legal context. Such a broad range of interests 
that vary from one legal context to another do not provide a basis for a 
professional framework that promotes certainty and direction to lawyers 
operating within that framework. Moreover, it does not address the 
scenario where the government lawyer and the government client have 
competing views on the public interest.
d. The pursuit of justice
In addition to the indeterminate demands of the rule of law and the 
somewhat amorphous in uence of the public interest, there is an additional 
ethical principle that informs and shapes certain government lawyers’ 
duties. This is the requirement that crown prosecutors, in pursuing and 
securing convictions, seek justice. While this principle falls broadly within 
the context of serving the public interest and, thus, may lend itself to a 
variety of contextual interpretations, it means that the crown prosecutor’s 
primary consideration is not to obtain a conviction, but rather to ensure that 
justice is done through a fair trial on the merits.39 In R v Boucher, Justice 
38. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 242.
39. Law Society of Ontario, supra note 8, Rule 5.1-3[1] (commentary 1—duty as prosecutor); R v 
Boucher [1955] SCR 16, 20 CR 1 [Boucher].
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Locke noted that, “prosecuting counsel should regard themselves rather 
as ministers of justice assisting in its administration than as advocates” 
that act on instructions of an actual client.40 The consequence is that, “the 
duty to represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law becomes 
transformed by the duty to act in the interests of justice.”41 While at  rst 
glance, this duty might elicit a certain skepticism that tempered advocacy 
is really about ‘saying mean things in a soft voice,’ the duty to seek justice 
has informed speci c prosecutorial duties.
Among other prosecutorial duties, the requirement to ‘do justice’ 
speci cally requires that crown prosecutors provide full disclosure 
even where the disclosure has exculpatory effects for the accused.42
Linked closely with this notion of doing justice is a further obligation to 
obtain and promote the truth regardless of the partisan positions of the 
respective parties. Pursuant to an obligation to seek justice, the scope of 
the prosecutor’s disclosure duties are different than the disclosure duties 
placed on the private law lawyer acting within an adversarial context. 
Again, in the private law context, it is understood that parties may be 
required to produce all information that is relevant to the matters in issue, 
but not be required to assist the opposing party in building its strongest 
case. Moreover, despite disclosure being an essential part of the adversarial 
process, it is not the only duty of crown prosecutors that is viewed 
through a justice-based lens.43 On this basis, this paper recommends that 
a justice ethic—already operationalized in certain government lawyering 
contexts might be expanded to provide a meaningful and comprehensive 
framework for ethical government lawyering beyond the sphere of crown 
prosecutors.44 
Generally speaking, the scope of the crown prosecutors’ justice ethic 
is framed by law society rules, judicial pronouncements in the relevant 
case law as well as internal guidelines published in the form of the 
40. Boucher, supra note 39 at 20; See also W Bradley Wendel, Ethics and Law an Introduction, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 159.
41. Deborah McNair, “In the Service of the Crown: Are Ethical Obligations Different for Government 
Counsel” (2005) 84:3 Can Bar Rev 501 at 515; See also Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 14.
42. Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2; R v Stinchcombe, [1991] 3 SCR 326, 130 NR 277 
[Stinchcombe]; See also Law Society of Ontario, supra note 8, Rule 5.1-3[1].
43. For example, the crown has a duty to ensure that the police investigations that support its cases 
are complete (R v Spackman, 2009 CanLII 37920 (ONSC)) and that once the crown is noti ed of 
relevant information, it cannot disregard the information. See R v MacNeil, 2009 SCC 3. Further 
responsibilities of crown prosecutors extend to the prosecutor’s conduct during cross-examinations, 
the presentation of evidence, representations made to court, and juries and treatment of self-represented 
accused;. See Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 14.
44. See text accompanying note 128, below.
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Deskbook.45 However, the justice ethic is not without its criticisms. For 
example, “[C]anadian prosecutors individually and collectively enjoy 
signi cant independence. They are largely immune from regulation by 
provincial law societies, from judicial review of exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion, or for an action in wrongful prosecution.”46 At every stage of 
the prosecutorial process, the prosecutor makes discretionary decisions 
regarding investigations, the pursuit of certain charges, plea bargaining 
and the process of trial. In this sense, prosecutors exercise a notable degree 
of power over their processes.47 This exercise of discretion (deemed 
somewhat necessary in the scope of criminal prosecutions) combined 
with contestable meanings of justice raises questions about the ef cacy 
and consistency of a justice ethic. Thus, notwithstanding the express 
recognition of the prosecutor’s obligation to seek justice, on any given 
 le, the crown prosecutors’ independence and discretion shrouds a review 
of the application of the justice interest in a particular case.48 
In the light of this patchwork of ethical and professional duties, this 
paper discusses establishing a larger more consistent and comprehensive 
guide for government lawyers acting in an adversarial capacity. Adopting 
such a framework is particularly relevant to government lawyers operating 
within various civil justice contexts including those lawyers acting in 
cases of mass torts and class actions against the government (particularly 
when claims involve allegations of mistreatment of vulnerable groups by 
government agents) as well as environmental claims. It is also pertinent 
where there is an array of competing public interests and groups, 
marginalized or otherwise whose lives may be particularly impacted by 
the decisions ultimately made. These instances call out for an underlying 
frame of reference and set of guiding principles for the government lawyer 
when making decisions regarding the government’s position and conduct 
in a legal dispute. In conjunction with a justice ethic is the further notion 
that, within government (as within different  elds of private law), there 
will be a need to add ‘mid-level’ rules that are tailored to respond to the 
speci c challenges that arise in a particular government practice-setting.49
45. Deskbook, supra note 31; Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2.
46. Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 3.
47. Wendel, supra note 40 at 163.
48. Further criticisms of the justice ethic are discussed later in this paper in great detail. See text 
accompanying note 131, below.
49. David B Wilkins, “Legal Realism for Lawyers” (1990) 104 Harv L Rev 468.
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II. St. Anne’s Residential School: A case study in government lawyer 
ethics
St. Anne’s Residential School in Fort Albany, Ontario involved some of 
the most egregious physical, sexual and psychological abuse of Indigenous 
children between 1941 and 1972.50 The St. Anne’s Residential School 
litigation is used as a cautionary (and truly tragic) tale regarding the 
problems associated with applying a private law ‘zealous advocacy’ model 
of professional ethics to government lawyers acting in a quasi-adversarial 
context. However, St. Anne’s also provides an important lens through 
which to examine a different approach to the ethical responsibilities of 
government lawyers. This section of the paper brie y introduces the St. 
Anne’s Residential School litigation, contextualizes the objectives and 
scope of the resolution of claims under the Independent Assessment 
Process (IAP) created under the Indian Residential School Settlement 
Agreement51 (IRSSA), and canvasses some of the problems that arose in 
respect of the IAP at St. Anne’s. 
1. The Independent Assessment Process under the IRSSA 
Before examining the particular context of the litigation involving St. 
Anne’s residential school, it is important to understand the IAP as part 
of the IRSSA. As well, it is vital to situate the government lawyers’ 
responsibilities within IAP as well as the larger IRSSA negotiated between 
the former students, churches, federal government, the Assembly of First 
Nations and other Indigenous organizations. The IRSSA is a “Canada-wide 
settlement encompassing residential school operations spanning more than 
a century and includes and estimated 79,000 class members in total.”52
Article 6 of the IRSSA established the IAP as the means for claimants to 
seek compensation for claims of serious physical abuse, sexual abuse, or 
other wrongful acts suffered by individuals while at residential schools. 
In Fontaine v Canada, Justice Brown described the IAP as a “modi ed 
adjudicative process.”53 The other mode of compensation under the IRSSA 
is the Common Experience Payment (CEP). As that term suggests, the 
CEP was designed to compensate all previous students for their Indian 
Residential School experience and the attendant lack of connection with 
50. Jorge Barrera, “The Horror’s of St. Anne’s,” CBC News (29 March 2018), online: 
<newsinteractives.cbc.ca/longform/st-anne-residential-school-opp-documents> [perma.cc/4TC8-
GNCM].
51. “Settlement Agreement” (8 May 2006), online: Residential Schools Settlement <www.
residentialschoolsettlement.ca/settlement.html> [perma.cc/MKC9-JDQD] [IRSSA].
52. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2012 BCSC 839 at para 28 [Fontaine 2012 BCSC].
53. Ibid at paras 29-30.
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family and loss of culture and language.54 Compensation pursuant to the 
CEP is available to everyone who resided in a residential school. Eligible 
individuals receive a payment of $10,000 for at least one or part of one 
year and then an additional $3,000 for each subsequent year.55 In addition, 
claimants may seek compensation from an adjudicator pursuant to the IAP. 
The IAP process is managed by the Indian Residential School 
Adjudication Secretariat (IRSAS). The executive director of the IRSAS 
has a dual reporting relationship to the chief adjudicator and the Deputy 
Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs. The chief adjudicator, who is 
court-appointed, reports directly to the supervising courts and is required to 
have an ‘arms-length’ relationship with Indigenous and Northern Affairs.56
The Settlement Agreement Operations Branch (SAO) is a branch within 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada that performs Canada’s functions 
as a respondent in the IAP claims resolution process.57 The government 
lawyers engaged in individual IAPs are employed by the Department of 
Justice.
The IAP process was designed to “facilitate the expedited resolution 
of claims for serious physical abuse, sexual assaults and other abuse 
resulting in serious psychological harm.”58 The IAP de nes the harms that 
are compensable and provides for a maximum compensation of $275,000 
plus an additional $250,000 in actual income loss resulting from the 
injury suffered by a claimant as a result of being a resident in a particular 
residential school.59 At this point, the average compensation awarded to 
claimants in the IAP has been approximately $91,000—considerably less 
54. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2018 BCSC 63 at para 9 [Fontaine 2018 BCSC], aff’d 2019 BCCA 
269. Please note that this case is currently on appeal to the SCC.
55. The average CEP payment is approximately $20,457. As of 2016, approximately 79,309 eligible 
former students had received a CEP payment. See Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Statistics 
on the Implementation of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement” online: <www.
aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1315320539682/1315320692192> [perma.cc/5BA4-XNRE]. 
56. See “About the Indian Residential School Adjudication Secretariat” (last updated 19 September 
2019), online: Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat <www.iap-pei.ca/about-eng.php> 
[perma.cc/59ER-7X4T] [IRSAS]. Note that as of July 2019, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
was replaced by Indigenous Services Canada and Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs 
Canada.
57. Fontaine v Canada (AG) 2016 ONCA 241 (appeal of the order of Justice Perell dated 6 August 
2014 regarding disclosure and archiving of documents generated in the IAP processes) [Fontaine 2016 
ONCA].
58. Baxter v Canada (AG), 2006 CanLII 41673 at para 7, 83 OR (3d) 481 (ONSC).
59. It is worth noting at as of January 2014, there were over $2 billion dollars in compensation 
awarded in respect of 17,000 claims. See Fontaine v Canada (AG) 2014 ONSC 283 at para 69 
[Fontaine 2014 ONSC]. This has subsequently been updated in the context of IAP proceedings.
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than the limits contemplated under the IRSSA.60 Since the commencement 
of this process, approximately, 3.24 billion dollars has been paid out in 
respect of about 26,703 IAP proceedings. Eighty-nine per cent of the 
claims made in the IAP have been successful.61 
In a quasi-inquisitorial fashion, it is the appointed adjudicator within 
the IAP process who is responsible for questioning the claimant about 
the details of the claim. The IAP is considered to be a form of litigation, 
albeit a modi ed form that is supposed to take account of the particularly 
sensitive nature of the claimants and claims brought forward.62 In fact, 
early in the IRSSA process, Justice Winkler stated that the IAP was 
“an opportunity to litigate their [claimant’s] claims in an extra-judicial 
process.” In a subsequent decision, Justice Brown stated, 
The purpose of the IAP is to provide a modi ed adjudicative proceeding 
for the resolution of claims of serious physical or sexual abuse suffered 
while at a residential school. The hearings are to be inquisitorial in nature 
and the process is designed to minimize further harm to claimants. The 
adjudicator presiding over the hearing is charged with asking questions 
to elicit the testimony of claimants. Counsel for the parties may suggest 
questions or areas to explore to the adjudicator but they do not question 
claimants directly. 
The hearings are meant to be considerate of the claimant’s comfort and 
well-being but they also serve an adjudicative purpose where evidence 
and credibility are tested to ensure that legitimate claims are compensated 
and false claims are weeded out. It is strongly recommended that 
claimants retain legal counsel to advance their claims within the IAP.63 
Notwithstanding the quasi-inquisitorial nature of the IAP, the corresponding 
powers of the adjudicators and the recognition of the sensitive nature of 
the claims under the IAP, courts have also stressed the need for legal 
representation for the claimants. Moreover, as noted in the case law and 
re ected in the certain positions adopted by government lawyers engaged 
in the IAP, the scope and jurisdiction of the process has been subject 
to debate. One of the questions that has dogged the process has been 
whether the IAP process is a continuation of the pre-existing litigation or a 
separate compensation scheme. The signi cance of this debate lies in the 
application of certain litigation-related duties and responsibilities and the 
60. “Independent Assessment Process (IAP) Statistics” (30 September 2019), online: Indian 
Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat <www.iap-pei.ca/stats-eng.php> [perma.cc/H42W-
3HLA] [IAP Statistics].
61. Ibid.
62. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59.
63. Fontaine 2012 BCSC, supra note 52 at para 29.
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powers of the supervisory courts to review the IAP decisions. These duties 
are in play in traditional litigation processes and subject to the principles 
of procedural fairness. Additionally, another issue that has been raised in a 
number of Requests for Direction (RFD) under the IRSSA is whether the 
terms of the IRSSA essentially forms the total landscape of the signatories’ 
duties and responsibilities in the IAP.64 This is particularly relevant in the 
context of the internal review process of adjudicators’ decisions and the 
role of the supervisory judges in each province.
In terms of procedure, a claimant commences the IAP process with an 
application not dissimilar to a private law pleading: the claimant outlines 
details of the harm or abuse, including dates, times, parties involved in 
the wrongdoing as well the individual’s request for compensation. If the 
claim is not previously settled, a hearing is held in front of an adjudicator. 
At the hearing, the adjudicator’s job is to evaluate the credibility of the 
claimant’s claim, assess the harm to the claimant and determine appropriate 
compensation.65 Adjudicators are expected to be “highly-quali ed 
individuals selected by all-party consensus, who receive intensive training 
approved by the IAP oversight committee and ongoing mentoring by 
the chief adjudicator and other senior adjudicators.”66 The main parties 
to the hearing are the claimant, their counsel (if they have counsel), 
representatives of the government of Canada as well as representatives of 
any relevant religious order that had been involved in running the school 
in question. Hearings are private and con dential. Moreover, an alleged 
perpetrator may be excluded when the claimant is testifying and there is 
no right of cross-examination by any alleged perpetrator.67 This is relevant 
in terms of the original design of the process being sensitive to the nature 
of the claims and the particular types of harms suffered by the claimants 
participating in the IAP. Parties may call witnesses; however, the 
specially-trained adjudicators manage the hearing, question the claimant 
64. These contrasting views were very recently considered by the SCC in the case of JW v Canada 
(AG), 2019 SCC 20 [JW SCC]. In that case, the majority held that while the parties do not have a 
broad right to judicial intervention, they do have a right to the implementation of the terms of the 
agreement. As such, the “existence of the agreement was contingent on judicial approval, and judicial 
approval, in turn, was contingent on ongoing judicial supervision” (ibid at para 23). However, in this 
context, judicial supervision means that the supervisory judges have an ongoing duty to supervise the 
administration and implementation of the agreement and ensure that the agreement is adhered to; not 
a broad right of judicial intervention. 
65. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2017 ONCA 26 at para 15 [Fontaine 2017 ONCA].
66. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2017 BCSC 946 at para 14.
67. The Attorney General of Canada v JW and Reo Law Corporation et al, 2017 MBCA 54 at para 
47 [JW Appeal]; Fontaine 2016 ONCA, supra note 57 at para 48.
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or witnesses and provide a decision with reasons.68 The lawyers present 
do not ask questions of the claimant directly, but may request that the 
adjudicator pursue certain lines of inquiry regarding the claimant’s claim 
(presumably including the scope or nature of the claim). 
Under the IAP, the claimant does not face direct cross-examination 
by the government lawyers. The claimant must prove his or her claim 
on a balance of probabilities. In structuring the process in this way, there 
are certain bene ts provided to the claimant, namely, closed hearings at 
a location of the claimant’s choosing, and the availability of a support 
person and/or trained counselors at the hearing.69 However, now that the 
process is almost complete, the question that remains to be explored in 
greater detail is how the claimants themselves experienced the IAP. 
2. The importance of narratives to the IRSSA and the IAP 
Pursuant to its disclosure obligations under the IRSSA, the government 
of Canada is obligated to provide information about the IAP claimants, 
the residential school in question as well as information about alleged 
perpetrators (persons of interest (POI) reports) and/or allegations of abuse 
at a particular school.70 Consistent with these obligations is the further 
requirement that the government prepare a narrative in respect of each 
of the residential schools. These narratives are essentially a history of a 
particular residential school prepared by the government and are intended 
to include reference to any abuse that took place at the school in question. 
Not insigni cantly, the obligation to disclose information and prepare 
the narrative is ongoing in the sense that as new information becomes 
available, the Canadian government is obligated to include it and update 
the narrative accordingly.71 As was noted by Justice Perrell, “Canada is 
not doing a favour in providing school narratives or POI reports; it is 
performing a hard-bargained for contractual promise.”72 Additionally, 
claimants and their counsel are entitled to documents collected in respect 
68. Fontaine 2017 ONCA, supra note 65 at para 14; Fontaine 2012 BCSC, supra note 52 at paras 
29-30.
69. JW Appeal, supra note 67 at para 47.
70. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 97.
71. Under the IRSSA, supra note 51 the government has an obligation to “search for, collect and 
provide a report about the persons named in the Application Form as having abused the Claimant, 
including information about those persons’ jobs at the residential school and the dates they worked 
or were there, as well as any allegations of physical or sexual abuse committed by such persons, 
where such allegations were made while the person was an employee or student” (ibid at Schedule D 
Appendix VIII “Government Document Disclosure”) [emphasis added]. Additionally, the government 
is required to gather documents about the residential school that the claimants attended and write a 
report summarizing those documents. These Narratives are also available to the claimant (as well as 
the underlying documents if requested); See also Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at paras 99-100.
72. Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 ONSC 4061 at para 68 [Fontaine 2015 ONSC].
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of a particular school. In the context of the IAP, the information contained 
in the narrative may be used by the adjudicator as a basis for fact- nding 
or credibility respecting a particular claimant’s claim of abuse.73 In fact, 
the IRSSA contemplates adjudicators taking previous criminal or civil 
trial into account in the IAP hearings.
3. Disclosure and related challenges in the IAP at St. Anne’s Residential 
School
The government and its lawyers engaged in the IAP at St. Anne’s Residential 
School prioritized traditional notions of the adversarial process over the 
truth-seeking and claim resolution objectives of the IRSSA. However, 
understanding the historical background of abuse, investigations and 
resulting civil and criminal litigation contextualizes the ethical challenges 
that arose in respect of the litigious nature of certain of the hearings at St. 
Anne’s.
a. The OPP disclosure
Between 1992 and 1996, the Ontario Provincial Police conducted an 
extensive investigation into abuse allegations at St. Anne’s. The abuse 
allegations spanned over 30 years and included serious physical, sexual 
and psychological abuse of students.74 There were over 992 statements 
taken from 700 individuals. The OPP obtained over 7000 documents from 
the religious organizations connected to the school. Ultimately in 1997, 
seven employees of St. Anne’s were charged with various abuse-related 
crimes and six of those individuals were convicted. The OPP information, 
including investigative documentation as well as trial transcripts, were not 
referenced in the  rst narratives that the government prepared pursuant 
to the IRSSA. Examples of the signi cant documentation not disclosed 
included expert medical evidence transcripts of Crown witnesses in the 
criminal trials respecting the type of abuse suffered at St. Anne’s. The 
medical evidence had been used by the crown prosecutors to articulate the 
nature of the abuse at St. Anne’s for the purpose of securing convictions in 
the criminal prosecutions. 
73. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 101.
74. Barrera, supra note 50: In a report prepared by the CBC documenting the abuse, survivors said 
that “nuns, priests and lay brothers would hit students with large straps, small whips, beaver snare 
wire, boards, books, rulers, yardsticks,  sts and open hands….Sometimes, students were locked away 
in the dark basement for hours at a time. They also told investigators of being force-fed porridge, 
spoiled  sh, cod liver oil and rancid horse meat that made students sick to the point of vomiting on 
their plates. They said they were often forced to then eat their vomit. There were numerous allegations 
of sexual abuse involving nuns, priests, lay brothers and other staff, ranging from fondling and forced 
kissing to violent attacks and nighttime molestation.” Ontario Provincial Police  les obtained by CBC 
News reveal the history of abuse at the notorious residential school that built its own electric chair.
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By 2000, a signi cant number of civil actions had been commenced 
by former students against the federal government in respect of the abuse 
that had taken place at St. Anne’s over a 30-year period. The government 
was named as a defendant in those actions.75 Ultimately, these actions 
were deemed dismissed pursuant to the terms of the IRSSA and continued 
as claims under the IRSSA.76 In 2003, prior to the dismissal of the class 
actions, the government of Canada had obtained an order for production 
of the OPP records for use in the civil actions it was defending in respect 
of St. Anne’s. In undertaking to obtain those OPP records, the government 
of Canada claimed such information was relevant and necessary for its 
defence of the civil actions. As a consequence of moving to obtain these 
records, the government had, at its disposal, a vast and extensive record of 
the history and scope of abuse at St. Anne’s for the purpose of defending 
civil actions pre-IRRSA.
Notwithstanding being in possession of this extensive documentation, 
the government made no mention of that same documentation once the 
civil actions were settled pursuant to the IRSSA and the IAP proceedings 
were initiated. The reality was that if class actions had continued against 
the government as a defendant, the government would have had ongoing 
disclosure requirements pursuant to the discovery process in litigation. In 
fact, the government had obtained the criminal records for the purpose 
of defending the class actions. Instead, pursuant to the IRSSA, these 
disclosure obligations were essentially replaced by the requirement that 
the government prepare a narrative under the IRSSA. Arguably, the 
government interpreted the scope of the disclosure requirement under the 
IRSSA in a different fashion. In the context of the IRSSA, the government 
took the position that it was “barred from producing the documents because 
they obtained the documents from the OPP subject to an undertaking that 
it would not disclose the documents to any third party.”77 The government 
also claimed that requiring it to produce the St. Anne’s documentation 
required the government to seek documents from third parties and that 
requiring this would be “burdening the government of Canada with this 
obligation.”78
75. See Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 36 which describes the civil actions commenced 
in respect of St. Anne’s.
76. Ibid.
77. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the 
Future: Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, (2015) 
at 27, online (pdf): <nctr.ca/assets/reports/Final%20Reports/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf> 
[perma.cc/A278-YPWM].
78. Ibid at 27-28; See also Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 24.
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IAP hearings in respect of the abuse allegations involving St. Anne’s 
were heard from 2007–2014, although challenges regarding certain of 
the adjudicator’s decisions have continued in the supervising courts. The 
government’s non-disclosure raises signi cant concerns about the scope 
of the information available to the adjudicators; the claimants’ abilities 
to establish abuse allegations and the scope of the compensation. One of 
the consequences was that a limited number of claimants were initially 
unable to establish the facts or timelines necessary to prove their claims 
of abuse under the IAP. Equally signi cant is the concern that the failure 
to produce information undermined the objectives of the IRSSA and 
reconciliation more generally. This was despite there being substantial 
information within the government’s control regarding the history of 
abuse at St. Anne’s. In fact, during the course of the IAP process involving 
St. Anne’s, the government was obligated to prepare multiple versions of 
the narratives and POI reports.79 These narratives with differing degrees 
of factual detail were created despite the government having access to the 
relevant information and materials from 2003 onward.
b. The incomplete narratives of St. Anne’s
In 2007–2008, Canada prepared its  rst narrative (post-IRRSA) in respect 
of St. Anne’s and in so doing, represented that four complaints not part 
of the OPP investigation constituted all of the identi able complaints and 
allegations known by the government. The narrative made no mention of 
the OPP documentation, the numerous allegations of sexual and physical 
abuse at St. Anne’s or the employees’ convictions and further suggested 
that there were no further incidents found in the documentation relating to 
sexual abuse at St. Anne’s.80 While the narratives are prepared by Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development Canada (as it was known at the time), 
the federal government and its lawyers were in possession of signi cant 
portion of information and documentation from 2003 onward.81 In effect, 
they had been made aware of the de ciencies in the narrative; however, 
79. Fontaine 2015 ONSC, supra note 72; Colin Perkel, “Court Urged to Clear up ‘Mystery’ of 
Hidden Residential School Documents,” CBC News (24 March 2017), online: <https://www.cbc.ca/
news/indigenous-court-urged-mystery-residential-school-documents-1.4040225> [perma.cc/KK8T-
G5SM].
80. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 126.
81. See text accompanying note 93, below. Speci cally, Justice Perell noted that the OPP documents 
and transcripts had been stored in the federal Department of Justice’s of ces in Toronto since 2003 but 
not provided to AANDC. 
A Less Private Practice:  Government Lawyers 339
and Legal Ethics
they made no attempt to correct the narrative for over a year.82 When 
confronted with these inaccuracies in the original narratives (given the 
OPP documentation) in the course of the RFD heard by Justice Perell, the 
government took the position that the omissions were not of “any moment 
or consequence.”83 In 2012, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) requested that Canada produce copies of all records relating to 
any criminal convictions at all residential schools.84 In response, Canada 
advised that it did not maintain a list of convictions. Contemporaneously, 
the government brought an RFD challenging its obligations under the 
IRSSA to produce the OPP documentation. In 2013, Canada prepared a 
new narrative that made reference to the OPP charges and convictions but 
made no reference to the criminal trial transcripts or OPP documents in the 
Department of Justice’s possession. The government took the position that 
it had not disclosed the criminal trial transcripts in its possession because 
the transcripts were irrelevant, inadmissible in respect of the assessment of 
individual claims and outside the scope of Canada’s disclosure obligations 
under the IRSSA.85 By contrast, it would appear that the disclosure 
obligations placed on private lawyers in litigation would be signi cantly 
more demanding than the government’s interpretation of its responsibilities 
under the IRSSA; which included a responsibility to prepare narratives and 
POI reports in respect of each of the residential schools including details 
of any complaints of abuse, those involved and what happened regarding 
those complaints.86 In contrast to other interpretive arguments asserted 
by the government respecting the scope of the IRSSA, the government 
asserted “signi cant discretion in how it structures and complies with its 
obligations”87 as it pertains to the Narratives and POI reports.
c. Government’s position on disclosure
In addition to the RFDs brought by the TRC and the government, 
approximately 60 of the St. Anne’s claimants also brought an application 
in the form of an RFD requiring the government produce the OPP records 
as well as all criminal and civil transcripts of proceedings involving abuse 
82. Goldblatt Partners, “Independent Assessment Process for Abuse Victims of Indian Residential 
Schools” (6 March 2014), online: <goldblattpartners.com/experience/class-action-cases/post/
independent-assessment-process-for-abuse-victims-of-residential-schools/> [perma.cc/H4EN-
6MM9].
83. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 127.
84. Ibid at para 12.
85. Ibid at para 124. Ultimately, Justice Perell ordered that the Government produce the copies of the 
OPP documents in its possession to the Commission.
86. See supra note 71 above outlining the duties of government to prepare a narrative.
87. Fontaine 2015 ONSC, supra note 72 at para 61.
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allegations at St. Anne’s and amend the narratives for St. Anne’s.88 During 
the course of this contest, lawyers for the government indicated that (i) it 
was compliant with its obligations under the IRSSA; (ii) the government’s 
disclosure obligations under the IRSSA did not extend to documents 
outside its possession; (iii) the government did not have to produce OPP 
documents in its control pursuant to the deemed undertaking rule; (iv) the 
statements made to the OPP regarding particular abuse allegations were 
not admissible in an IAP hearing because live testimony was required 
and/or the OPP information was not probative; and (v) the government 
was not obligated to produce information about abuse allegations about 
persons of interest once they left the school.89 In its submissions, the 
government further maintained that it retained the right to argue relevance 
and admissibility of the OPP documents, if ordered produced, at each 
IAP proceeding. As a  nal position, the government argued that the 
supervising court would not have jurisdiction to appoint an individual to 
review settled claims to determine if they were prejudiced by the ‘alleged’ 
non-disclosure.90 It is worth noting that subsequent to Justice Perell’s 
order to produce the OPP documentation, in August 2014, the government 
produced over 12,000 documents. However, the material “including trial 
transcripts, witness statements to police, even certi cates of conviction, 
was heavily redacted.”91 In fact, this redaction included the names of 
perpetrators as well the names of possible witnesses. 
In addition to maintaining these positions on the OPP disclosure, 
certain of the government’s positions on disclosure in the St. Anne’s 
IAP process do not meet a minimum standard required of parties in 
private civil litigation. For instance, the government exerted privilege 
over a variety of documents relating to the civil actions involving St. 
Anne’s, but, in so doing, failed and/or refused to identify the privileged 
documents in question; contrary to established practice under provincial 
procedural rules and relevant case law.92 Instead of complying with basic 
disclosure standards, the government made blanket claims of privilege 
88. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, supra note 76 at 27; Fontaine 2014 ONSC, 
supra note 59.
89. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at paras 143, 216-217.
90. Ibid at para 24.
91. Tonda MacCharles, “Heavily edited Residential School documents an Obstruction of Justice, 
NDP says,” The Toronto Star (4 September 2014), online: <www.thestar.com/news/canada/2014/09/04/
heavilyedited_residential_schools_documents_an_obstruction_of_justice_ndp_says.html> [perma.
cc/GF3G-VDVJ]; See also Barrera, supra note 50.
92. See e.g., Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, Rule 30.03(2)(b) [Civil Procedure]; 
Grossman v Toronto General Hospital (1983), 41 OR (2d) 457, 146 DLR (3d) 280.
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that would be dif cult for the claimants’ lawyers to dispute in a vacuum.93
Again, this course of conduct is inconsistent with the obligations of 
parties (and by extension, private law lawyers) under the Rules of Civil 
Procedure respecting privileged documents.94 Not surprisingly, there 
were consequences associated with the government’s non-disclosure. For 
example, one claimant was denied his claim on the basis that he could not 
establish the correct timeline respecting a priest’s presence at the school, 
evidence of which was within the government’s knowledge at the time of 
his claim. As a consequence, he was obligated to re-tell his story of horri c 
sexual abuse, after asserting a right to have a review and re-review of the 
adjudicator’s original decision.95 
Pursuant to an Order of the Superior Court in early January 2014, Justice 
Perell ordered the government to produce civil and criminal transcripts 
relating to St. Anne’s and to revise its narrative accordingly.96 Ultimately, 
the government did not appeal the January 2014 Order of Justice Perrell 
requiring that it disclose the OPP-related documentation involving St. 
Anne’s nor did it seek an amendment of Justice Perell’s order. Rather, 
in June 2014 (approximately 4 months after the decision was handed 
down), lawyers for the Government sent a letter to the Superior Court 
advising that the Government would not produce certain civil proceeding 
transcripts of examinations for discovery. The Government, through its 
lawyers, claimed it was doing so, on the basis of “settlement privilege and/
or undertakings of con dentiality given to the plaintiffs in the pre-IRSSA 
settlements.”97 Moreover, the government asserted that non-disclosure of 
certain transcripts was consistent with the goals of reconciliation.98 Again, 
it is important to note that the private law lawyer, having disagreed with 
the decision of a Superior Court judge, would not be entitled to clarify and 
unilaterally limit a judge’s order.99
d. Legal argument respecting abuse at St. Anne’s
Separate from the disclosure issues in the St. Anne’s residential school 
litigation, there was another troubling aspect involving the adoption by 
government lawyers of certain legal positions respecting the scope of 
93. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 128.
94. Civil Procedure, supra note 89, Rule 30.02, 30.03.
95. Fontaine v Canada (AG) (May 31, 2018) Toronto Court File No. C63804 (ONCA) (Cost 
Submissions of Independent Counsel) at para 20-23 [Fontaine Cost Submissions] [on  le with the 
author].
96. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59.
97. Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 95 at paras 18-19.
98. Fontaine v Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 2487 [Fontaine 2017 ONSC].
99. Ibid at paras 78-79.
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‘abuse’ under the terms of the IRSSA.100 Several of the survivors of St. 
Anne’s had made reference to a homemade electrical chair located in the 
school and used as a form of punishment for the students. The children 
would be strapped to the chair and electrocuted, sometimes to the verge of 
or past unconsciousness. Details of the electric chair and its uses had been 
documented in the OPP documentation in the government’s possession. 
However, during the early IAP process (from approximately 2008–2015), 
the government lawyers argued that the use of the electric chair did not 
constitute physical abuse under the terms of the IRSSA and therefore 
students subject to this ‘treatment’ were not entitled to compensation. A 
similar approach was taken with regard to allegations that children at St. 
Anne’s had been forced to eat their own vomit as a form of punishment. 
These arguments were ultimately withdrawn as a consequence of Crown-
Indigenous Relations Minister Bennett instructing government counsel to 
stop making this argument as a basis for challenging a claimant’s abuse 
claims.101 
e. Critique of government lawyers in the independent assessment process
The relationship between the government lawyers and St. Anne’s 
survivors seeking compensation pursuant to the IAP under the IRSSA has 
been described as a “festering sore of suspicion, animosity, distrust and 
shared resentment.”102 Notwithstanding Elizabeth Sanderson’s comments 
respecting government lawyers’ obligations in litigation, the conduct of 
the government lawyers engaged in certain IAP processes at St. Anne’s 
does not re ect a tempered approach to advocacy or a justice-seeking 
ethic. In the context of a second RFD respecting the inadequacy of the 
narratives and POI reports on St. Anne’s, the government commented 
that “to the extent that any document (source or otherwise) bene ts a 
claimant’s case, it is the claimant and their counsel that bears the onus of 
producing that document.”103 This type of comment re ects a commitment 
to zealous advocacy consistent with hard-fought private civil litigation. 
However, if there was ever a time for government lawyers to adopt a 
different ethical stance, it is in respect of this quasi-inquisitorial process 
100. For more detail of the allegations in this regard, see supra note 50, above.
101. Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa initially fought St. Anne’s residential school electric chair compensation 
claims,” CBC News (2 December 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/Indigenous/st-annes-residential-
school-electric-chair-compensation- ght-1.4429594> [perma.cc/M36C-6A9P].
102. See the quote from Justice Perell in Gloria Galloway, “Carolyn Bennett asks Catholic groups to 
allow residential school survivors to have documents outlining abuse made public,” The Globe and 
Mail (16 January 2018), online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/carolyn-bennett-asks-
catholic-groups-to-allow-residential-school-survivors-to-have-documents-outlining-abuse-made-
public/article37615745/> [perma.cc/SM9P-TC9T].
103. Fontaine 2017 ONSC, supra note 98 at para 64.
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where residential school survivors and the government were attempting to 
allocate compensation in respect of historical claims of serious physical 
and sexual abuse against members of Indigenous communities. 
Thus, insofar as there is any accepted wisdom among legal ethicists 
and government lawyers that there ought to be a different ethical 
framework for government lawyers, the example of St. Anne’s makes the 
development of such a framework an ever more compelling and urgent 
task. The various court proceedings that have arisen out of the IAP process 
at St. Anne’s suggest that the government lawyers adopted an intensely 
adversarial approach to its disclosure requirements and interpretation of 
the IRSSA.104 While it is acknowledged that the majority of the claims 
made by former residents of St. Anne’s were resolved without a court-
involved contest, the various RFDs, appeals and positions taken by 
government lawyers throughout the IAP process at St. Anne’s suggest a 
continued and unchecked adherence by those same government lawyers to 
the principle of zealous advocacy. This is inconsistent with reconciliation 
and the resolution of residential school abuse claims. In fact, in the context 
of some of the legal disputes involving St. Anne’s, there is a major gap 
between how Elizabeth Sanderson suggests that government lawyers 
should act in the IRSSA and how the government lawyers actually 
conducted themselves in respect of St. Anne’s. Sanderson suggests Crown 
lawyers involved in cases with Indigenous individuals or groups should 
“build reconciliation into the resolution of the litigation” and, in so doing, 
“temper the professional duty to raise fearlessly any issue or ask every 
question however distasteful, where the public interest factors such as the 
 scal responsibility, judicial economy, pursuit of justice, healing and harm 
reduction, and nation-building compel it.”105 The sentiment was echoed by 
Justice Perell when he stated that: 
[i]f truth and reconciliation is to be achieved and if nous le regrettons, 
we are sorry, nimitataynan, niminchinowesamin, mamiattugut, is to be 
a genuine expression of Canada’s request for forgiveness for failing our 
Aboriginal Peoples so profoundly, the justness of the system for the 
compensation for the victims must be protected. The substantive and 
procedural access to justice of the IRSSA, like any class action, must 
also be protected and vouched safe. The court has the jurisdiction to 
ensure that the IRRSA provides both procedural and substantive access 
104. See the following cases as examples in this regard: Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59; 
Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2018 ONCA 421; JW Appeal, supra note 67; Fontaine et al v Canada (AG), 
2014 MBQB 200 [Fontaine MBQB], Fontaine 2017 ONCA, supra note 65; Fontaine 2016 ONCA, 
supra note 57; Fontaine et al v Canada (AG), 2013 ONSC 684; JW SCC, supra note 64.
105. Sanderson, supra note 1 at 132-133.
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to justice.106 
However, this does not appear to be the approach adopted by the government 
lawyers in the St. Anne’s Residential School litigation. Moreover, the 
approach taken by the government lawyers in respect of St. Anne’s would 
also appear to run contrary to the Department of Justice Values and Ethics 
Code of Conduct that came in to effect in February 2013. According to this 
internal code of conduct, the Department of Justice is committed to carrying 
out its duties in a non-partisan and impartial manner and further committed 
to “providing decision-makers with all the information, analysis and advice 
they need.”107 Presumably, the withholding of signi cant documentation 
about the historical abuse at St. Anne’s would appear to undermine the 
Department of Justice’s commitment in this regard. The disputes over the 
disclosure of information about the abuse at St. Anne’s and, in respect of 
certain positions taken by the government lawyers respecting the scope 
of the IRSSA, IAP and the nature of compensable abuse all point to an 
unbridled approach to zealous advocacy that is focused on winning rather 
than a non-partisan and impartial approach to their professional duties. 
Thus, again, notwithstanding the technical arguments the government 
could make in the context of the IAP process, the more signi cant question 
is whether they should have made such arguments and what they hoped to 
achieve in so doing. What lawyers can do is not the sole test of what they 
should do as a matter of legal ethics and professional responsibility.
However, it is not only the failure to produce relevant documentation 
or include certain information in the narratives prepared by the 
government that causes concern about the professional approach adopted 
by the government lawyers involving St. Anne’s. It is also the positions 
adopted by the government lawyers when confronted with their non-
disclosure and, more importantly, requests for additional information 
or more comprehensive and accurate narratives. In such instances, the 
government lawyers adopted traditional adversarial positions regarding 
the government’s obligations. The lawyers adopted the position that the 
OPP information and information from the earlier civil actions were 
immaterial, not likely to impact the outcome of the IAP processes, subject 
to the deemed undertakings rule, subject to settlement privilege, not 
106. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59 at para 226.
107. Department of Justice, “Chapter 1: Values” (26 February 2013), online: The Department of Justice 
Values and Ethics Code of Conduct <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/vec-cve/c1.html#Chapter1> 
[perma.cc/H48H-2K8E]; See also the discussion regarding internal codes of conduct contained in 
Morris & Nishikawa, supra note 17 at 180 in which the authors assert that internal codes of conduct 
such as the Department of Justice’s code are a better means by which to regulate the unique ethical and 
professional duties of government lawyers.
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required respecting persons of interest once they left the school and  nally, 
that the government was not obligated to produce the civil transcripts 
under Schedule D of the IRSSA on the basis of settlement privilege or 
the deemed undertaking rule (then subsequently acknowledging no basis 
in law for such positions).108 While it is not disputed that the privilege 
and the deemed undertaking rule represent legitimate responses of a party 
engaged in disclosure disputes in civil litigation, the issue here is the use 
of these positions by the government within the IAP and the context of the 
IRSSA, and reconciliation more broadly. 
As a consequence, the claimants, their lawyers and the TRC were 
forced to take the government to court to compel it to ful ll its obligations 
under the IRSSA. Without such steps being taken, it is likely that the 
full scope of the history of abuse at St. Anne’s would not have come to 
light. Added to this is the position adopted by the government in respect 
of the immateriality of the disclosure ultimately ordered disclosed by 
Justice Perell. Speci cally, the government lawyers took and continue 
to take the position that the court-ordered disclosure was immaterial to 
the IAP at St. Anne’s. This later position in particular serves to highlight 
a disconnect between a narrowly construed and traditionally adversarial 
position adopted by the government lawyers in respect of the ‘proof’ 
of claims in the IAP and the broad reconciliation objectives underlying 
the government’s participation in the IRSSA. These broader objectives 
contemplated the creation of ongoing narratives that chronicle the history 
of abuse perpetrated against the residential school students; however, in 
the case of St. Anne’s, an adversarial-based rationalization overtook those 
broader objectives. 
Recently, the federal government disclosed that it had spent 
approximately $2.3 million in respect of the continuing legal disputes 
involving the St. Anne’s IAP process.109 Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
asserted that this sum includes the cumulative salaries of certain of its 
lawyers. The government defended these costs on the basis that the 
government was obligated to respond to various legal proceedings brought 
by the claimants and the TRC. However, arguably, what necessitated 
the government’s need to respond was its failure to disclose relevant 
information about the history of abuse at the school. 
108. Fontaine 2014 ONSC, supra note 59; Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 95; Interview with 
Independent Counsel, 5 October 2018.
109. Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa spent $2.3M on court battles with St. Anne’s residential school survivors,” 
CBC News (20 September 2018), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/Indigenous/federal-legal-battle-costs-
stannes-residential-school-1.4831887> [perma.cc/8Q2C-TJP4].
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The position taken by the government is highly problematic. 
Following Justice Perell’s disclosure order of January 2014, government 
lawyers advised the court by letter that the government would not comply 
with certain aspects of the order. It raises certain troubling questions 
about the government lawyers’ views about the application of the rule of 
law to government conduct. Notwithstanding that government lawyers’ 
professional duties are often framed in terms of their role as protectors of 
the rule of law and guardians of the public interest, the decision to clarify 
a court order sends a message that expressly undermines the rule of law.110
Again, in the private law context, it would be dif cult to conceive of a 
scenario in which it would be appropriate professionally for a losing party 
to advise the court by writing that they did not intend to comply with the 
terms of a judicial order made against them. This is particularly troubling 
when the order in question required that the party produce information 
relevant to the dispute between the parties. In the private law setting, 
such action would likely be met with the striking of a party’s pleading, 
signi cant costs and possibly a contempt order against a party that fails to 
comply with a court order. 
Finally, and most recently, the federal government has sought 
declarations from certain of the IRSSA-designated supervisory courts (in 
the form of RFDs and appeals from RFDs) regarding the inapplicability of 
the principles of procedural fairness to the IRSSA process and the scope 
of judicial review of IAP decisions.111 This has arisen in several contexts 
including both the review and re-review of IAP decisions in cases where 
the dismissal of a claimant’s claim is linked to insuf cient disclosure and/
or  awed interpretations of the terms of the IRSSA by an adjudicator.112
Adopting the position that the IRSSA does not incorporate any accepted 
norms of procedural fairness (other than those explicitly articulated in the 
express terms of the IRSSA) raises dif cult questions about the types of 
110. Dodek, supra note 2 at 20; Sanderson, supra note 1 at 80.
111. JW SCC, supra note 64; Jorge Barrera, “Ottawa gets sealing order on court document that 
undercuts ‘reconciliation agenda’ says NDP MP,” CBC News (14 March 2019), online: <www.cbc.
ca/news/Indigenous/bc-judge-seals-residential-school-compensation-case-documents-1.5054761> 
[perma.cc/5C2A-ZXM3]; See also Fontaine v Canada, (Attorney General) 2020 BCSC 63 (17 January 
2018) Vancouver L051875 (BSSC) (Request for Direction (Re: Re-Review and Review Jurisdiction 
of the Chief Adjudicator and Adjudicators)) at para 2 [Request for Direction]. Fontaine v Canada 
(Attorney General) 2020 ONSC 336.
112. Request for Direction, supra note 111. In Fontaine v Canada (AG), Fontaine 2018 BCSC, supra 
note 54 at para 41, counsel for Canada submitted that “procedural fairness is an administrative law 
construct that the Chief Adjudicator and his designates have used as a means of importing new rights 
for IAP claimants, rights for which the parties did not contract”; For further iterations of this argument 
see JW SCC, supra note 64; Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2017 BCSC 946; and Fontaine 2017 ONCA, 
supra note 65.
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positions that the government should adopt in a quasi-inquisitorial process 
that aims to provide compensation for those who suffered abuse at the 
hands of the government in the  rst place. Moreover, it would appear that 
ensuring that IAP adjudicators are impartial and adjudicating without bias 
would be components of procedural fairness that are important to the federal 
government.113 In attempting to reconcile the role it played in creating the 
harm in the  rst place, it is questionable whether the government should 
adopt positions that seek to undermine or limit accepted norms of fairness 
and justice.114 In fact, it is troubling that a party uses a variety of arguments 
typically grounded in ensuring a fair procedural process in order to defend 
against certain disclosure obligations (i.e., the deemed undertaking 
rule) and then rejects notions of procedural fairness when it suits other 
objectives such as a claimant’s right to review in circumstances where new 
evidence was adduced.115 Finally, to suggest that there is no entitlement 
to principles of procedural fairness because the process is contractual in 
nature is problematic in light of the nature of the bargain made; namely, 
the resolution of claims of serious sexual and physical abuse in a sensitive 
and compassionate forum. 
In this regard, an RFD was brought by the government involving the 
assertion by government lawyers that principles of procedural fairness do 
not apply to the residential school settlement process.116 In fact, the position 
adopted by the government’s counsel is that the IAP provides a “complete 
code for which the parties have speci ed all of the procedural protects 
that they intended.”117 Additionally, the government lawyers in this case 
also sought a sealing order from Justice Brown in respect of this RFD. 
The government’s position respecting the sealing order was grounded in 
protecting the identity of the claimants in the IAP. Notwithstanding the 
legitimacy of this concern, it is a little dif cult to see how con dentiality 
might extend to legal arguments made by the government in respect of the 
legal interpretation of the terms of the IRSSA. 
113. Fontaine 2018 BCSC, supra note 54 at para 48.
114. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Unsettling the Lawyers: Other Forms of Justice in Indigenous Claims 
of Expropriation, Abuse and Injustice” (2014) 64:4 U Toronto LJ 620; JW Appeal, supra note 66.
115. For example, Claimant H-15019 who sought a re-review of his claim in respect of abuse at St. 
Anne’s once it was determined that evidence contained in the OPP  les would have assisted his claims 
(Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 95 at paras 202-223).
116. Fontaine v The Attorney General of Canada 2020 BCSC 63, (17 January 2018) Vancouver 
L051875 (BSSC) (Request for Direction (Re: Re-Review and Review Jurisdiction of the Chief 
Adjudicator and Adjudicators)) at para 2; Barrera, supra note 103.
117. Fontaine 2018 BCSC, supra note 54 at paras 39-42; Appeal Record of Independent Counsel in 
Fontaine v Canada (AG), BCCA. In this case, the Government sought and was granted a sealing order 
respecting its arguments. 
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In the circumstances of St. Anne’s Residential School litigation, the 
government lawyers would be hard pressed to articulate the legitimate 
public interests that informed some of the steps (particularly as it relates 
to the OPP disclosure) they took during the IRSSA process. Speci cally, 
if the public interest was to minimize the  nancial costs by putting 
claimants to the near impossible task of proving claims without the 
requisite information and by challenging the validity of claims,118 it would 
appear that the government lawyers adopted a very ‘private law’ notion of 
their role: they infused public lawyering with private values.119 However, 
if the public interest that the government claimed to be pursuing was 
reconciliation (and a fundamental change in Canada’s relationship with 
Indigenous people),120 the withholding of 12,000 pages of information 
about the abuse at St. Anne’s residential school and adoption of hard-line 
litigation tactics and positions undermines meaningful reconciliation. 
III. A different direction for government lawyers
Having offered a critical take on the St. Anne’s litigation, I will canvass some 
different approaches to re-framing the ethical duties and responsibilities of 
government lawyers. In so doing, I will focus more particularly on the 
potential bene ts that a justice ethic might add. In an effort to articulate 
a different approach to legal ethics for government lawyers, differing 
emphasis has been placed on the scope of the government lawyer’s 
ability to access and exercise public power and their responsibilities in 
respect of their role as guardians of the rule of law and promoters of the 
public interest given this public authority.121 These approaches will also 
be canvassed in the course of this discussion with the hope that the re-
framing of government lawyers’ ethical duties might build on these earlier 
approaches. Before canvassing these approaches, it is worth noting that 
not all theories of legal ethics contemplate a higher or different standard 
118. The chief adjudicator of the Indian Residential School Adjudication Secretariat, Dan Ish, has 
indicated that there were three times more applications for the IAP process than had been expected 
at the outset, thereby extending the duration of the IAP and the associated costs: Kathleen Martens, 
“Outgoing Chief Adjudicator criticizes lawyers in residential school compensation process,” APTN 
National News (11 March 2013), online: <aptnnews.ca/2013/03/11/outgoing-chief-adjudicator-
criticizes-lawyers-in-residential-school-compensation-process/> [perma.cc/TF9E-WZCY].
119. Berenson, supra, note 16 at 45. It is worth noting that as of 2014, there were approximately 
17,000 resolved residential school claims totaling about 2 billion dollars. Originally, Canada had put 
aside a $1.9 billion fund in respect of the CEP payments. Additionally, Canada agreed to “fund the IAP 
to the extent necessary to ensure its implementation” (Fontaine 2016 ONCA, supra note 57 at para 21).
120. Principles, supra note 20.
121. Dodek, supra note 2 at 20: All members of the legal profession have a professional responsibility 
to uphold respect for the rule of law however there are particular statutory duties placed on the attorney 
general and its representatives to ensure that public matters are carried out in accordance with the law.
See also Sanderson, supra note 1 at 84.
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of conduct for government lawyers. In this regard, Andrew Martin notes, 
“others—almost all of whom are government lawyers—argue that there 
are no special ethical obligations on government lawyers. While they 
largely recognize ‘public interest’ duties, these commentators argue that 
such duties do not constitute ethical duties.”122 A further critique of the 
call for a higher or different ethical standard for government lawyers 
is that such a higher standard presupposes a lower standard for the rest 
of the profession; an assumption that is not particularly palatable to the 
profession or the public (and certainly not accepted in the context of this 
paper).123
Despite objections over the application or appropriateness of a different 
ethical standard for government lawyers, the reality is that such standard 
already exists for crown prosecutors. As a response to and check on the 
public power exercised by crown prosecutors, they have speci c duties. 
These duties restrain the government’s ability to pursue, prosecute and 
punish individuals who have allegedly contravened the law. While these 
duties are situated in the criminal context, it is entirely reasonable that 
there may be other types of proceedings brought forward by government 
and/or that government defends that can and do have serious consequences 
for individuals or groups.124 Arguably, government lawyers acting in these 
contexts would be subject to the same justice-seeking ethical duties as 
crown prosecutors. 
However, before exploring the application of a justice ethic in more 
detail, this paper takes account of some of the existing approaches to 
government lawyer ethics that have contributed to the discourse in this 
 eld and in so doing, provides a basis for a distinct ethical approach for 
government lawyers. The intent is to build upon aspects of these existing 
perspectives in legal ethics to formulate a theory of legal ethics that takes 
account of the unique position, power and challenges of government 
lawyers. One such approach is grounded in the government’s democratic 
and representational role. The scope of a government’s ‘representative’ 
nature is that it is representative of all citizens, including those who 
disagree with and challenge the government’s policies or conduct. In light 
of its representative nature, it is imperative that governments remember its 
obligation to represent all citizens when in an adversarial relationship with 
122. Martin & Telfer, supra note 10 at 454 citing Dodek, supra note 2.
123. Everingham v Ontario (1992), 8 OR (3d) 121, 88 DLR (4th) 755 (Div Ct).
124. Examples of such cases might include the operation of certain publicly-owned facilities; 
regulation of medical drugs; the management of blood transfusion cases; solitary con nement in 
prisons, Indigenous child welfare cases.
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one (or more) of its citizens.125 This obligation also extends to the lawyers 
acting on behalf of the government. When representing a government 
entity that is in opposition to a legitimate claim of one of its citizens, the 
government lawyer must also take meaningful account of the fact that 
their client’s adversaries are also its citizens. In this context, government 
lawyers cannot adopt a neutral partisanship approach to lawyering that 
declines to engage in a meaningful assessment of the implications of its 
client’s actions on an adversarial party. 
The rationale underlying this approach is similar to that underlying the 
responsibilities placed on crown prosecutors in the criminal context. More 
speci cally, in lawyering legitimate claims made against it by its citizens, 
the “nature of the government’s relationship to that citizen is different from 
the relationship a private disputant would have with that citizen, and that 
the nature of this relationship shapes the nature of the lawyer’s duties in his 
or her representation of government.”126 In this capacity, they adopt a ‘duty 
of fair dealing’ whereby government lawyers recognize that the minimum 
requirements placed on private lawyers in legal proceedings in respect 
of adversaries are insuf cient in legal disputes involving government 
entities and private citizens.127 While the basis for this approach is clearly 
grounded in notions of democracy and representative government, the 
articulation of how this duty might operate in practice is more general in 
its application. For instance, Cotter suggests that ful lling this duty would 
require government lawyers to admit “what should reasonably be admitted, 
conceding what should reasonably be conceded, [and] accommodating 
what should reasonably be accommodated.”128
This quali cation alone does not go far enough in re-de ning the 
scope of the government lawyer’s ethical responsibilities in litigation 
outside the particular context of crown prosecutors. A ‘duty of fair 
dealing’ places certain obligations on government lawyers to recognize 
the legitimate and con icting interests of its citizens. They must act fairly 
when engaging in legal con ict with such citizens. However, it does not 
provide a mechanism by which to balance legitimate and contradictory 
interests of citizens and government. As such, as an ethical consideration, 
a ‘duty of fair dealing’ may be more appropriate as a guiding principle 
for the government ‘clients’ instructing government lawyers than the 
government lawyers acting on those instructions. In addition, this duty 
125. Cotter, “Legal Accountability,” supra note 2 at 70. 
126. Cotter, “Evolving ‘Public Interest,’” supra note 2 at 160. 
127. Ibid.
128. Cotter, “Legal Accountability,” supra note 2 at 71.
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does not contain a descriptive account of what constitutes ‘fair dealing’ 
in the context of the actual steps to be taken by government lawyers in 
a given case. Moreover, when such aspirational language (without more 
detailed articulation) is confronted with the pressures associated with the 
deeply ingrained traditional professional framework of zealous advocacy 
and neutral partisanship, it would not be surprising that many government 
lawyers would default to the traditional approach to professional conduct. 
It is for these reasons, among others, that the extension of a justice-seeking 
ethic (currently articulated only in the context of criminal prosecutions) 
could provide a helpful framework for ethical government lawyering more 
generally. 
The duty of fair dealing is also consistent with another approach to 
government lawyer ethics that recognizes the unique powers exercised 
by government lawyers. Speci cally, the basis for this approach to and 
justi cation for a higher standard of ethical conduct for government 
lawyers is grounded in the assertion that government lawyers exercise 
power on behalf of the state.129 In this regard, Adam Dodek states that: 
[g]overnment lawyers interpret, advise and advocate on the powers and 
duties of the Crown. In so doing, government lawyers exercise public 
power. This exercise of public power is therefore the key distinction 
between government lawyers and all other lawyers. This is why it is an 
oversimpli cation, an understatement and is misleading to characterize 
government lawyers as lawyers for an organization.130 
This imposition of a higher standard associated with the exercise of public 
power is, in part, informed by the attorney general’s responsibility (and 
all those lawyers who act on behalf of the attorney general) to uphold the 
rule of law. In effect, it is the government lawyer’s responsibility to ensure 
that the actions and policies of the government are consistent with the rule 
of law.131 Along with the recognition that government lawyers exercise 
public power (and, as such, should be held to a higher standard of conduct) 
129. Dodek, supra note 2 at 18.
130. Ibid. For a contrasting view respecting the assertion that government lawyers should be subject 
to a higher standard of professional conduct see Deborah McNair, “In the Service of the Crown: Are 
Ethical Obligations Different for Government Counsel” (2006) 84:3 Can Bar Rev 501 and John Mark 
Keyes, “The Professional Responsibilities of Legislative Counsel” (2009) 3 JPPL 453.
131. This assertion has led to different characterizations of the importance of the solicitor–client 
relationship between government lawyers and the governmental entity they advise. Morris & 
Nishikawa, supra note 17 suggests that the solicitor–client relationship must be jealously protected in 
order to ensure that government lawyers are able to provide meaningful advice to government bodies 
regarding the legality of a proposed course of action. Similarly, John Mark Keyes suggest that this 
relationship is grounded in a duty of loyalty and trust that is needed such that governmental ‘clients’ 
can rely on their legal advisers to provide sound advice in Keyes, supra note 2.
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is the corresponding recognition that there are speci c contexts outside 
of criminal prosecutions in which government lawyers are expected to 
act differently. Further examples of these include where the Honour of 
the Crown is invoked in legal matters engaging Indigenous groups or 
where government is engaged in litigation involving vulnerable parties, 
regardless of whether those parties are represented by counsel.132 In these 
instances, the objective for the government lawyer is not winning the case 
on behalf of the government. Rather, it is ensuring that there is a fair and 
just outcome in the resolution of the matter. 
The suggestion that there should be a higher standard of conduct when 
vulnerable parties are involved is a worthy objective, but it raises certain 
questions. For instance, it tends to not address whether the presence of a 
well-lawyered opposing vulnerable party would relieve the government 
lawyers of conducting themselves in accordance with such a higher 
standard.133 In fact, there is a concern that a well-lawyered opposing party 
would alleviate the government lawyer’s duty to deal with the party fairly and 
result in a retreat to more traditional modes of adversarial professionalism. 
In addition to obligations stemming from the government lawyers’ role as 
guardians of the rule of law and/or democratic representatives, a further 
consideration engages government lawyers’ public interest duties. This 
is framed in terms of the government lawyers’ additional role as public 
servant; a role that requires that the government lawyer act independently 
of partisan politics.134 
Taking account of the important contributions that these approaches 
make as well as the challenges associated with implementing a duty of 
fair dealing and a public interest or rule of law-based higher standard of 
conduct, the next section of this paper discusses the merits of applying a 
justice-seeking ethic to government lawyering outside the context of crown 
prosecutors. It also addresses the criticisms associated with this approach 
as well as the ways in which such an ethic might inform government 
lawyers’ practice outside of the criminal context.
1. Toward a justice ethic 
Interestingly, the previous sampling of approaches to government 
lawyer ethics incorporate by comparison the speci c ethical duties and 
responsibilities of crown prosecutors. However, neither go so far as to 
suggest that a justice ethic should be adopted by all government lawyers 
working in an adversarial context. This section intends to make just that 
132. Dodek, supra note 2 at 26.
133. Berenson, supra note 16 at 45.
134. Martin & Telfer, supra note 10 at 454. 
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suggestion. In drawing upon the bene ts of these earlier approaches as 
well as the limitations associated with them, my argument is that the 
justice ethic could be expanded to encompass government lawyers acting 
outside the criminal context. In addition to discussing the merits and 
challenges associated with adopting such an approach, this section will 
brie y examine those aspects of legal practice that would be subject to 
a justice ethic (taking account of the lessons learned from St. Anne’s) as 
well as propose language that could form the basis of a professional rule 
in this regard. 
In the context of the crown prosecutor, the justice ethic has resulted in 
both a general direction to act fairly as well as the articulation of particular 
duties and responsibilities owed by crown prosecutors when prosecuting 
criminal cases. The adoption of a justice-seeking ethic re ects the 
signi cant power and responsibility that criminal prosecutors have over 
citizens. Over time, this ethic has been articulated through a variety of 
sources including case-law, the rules of professional conduct and internal 
manuals. The result is a framework that more contextually governs how 
crown prosecutors are expected to conduct themselves when prosecuting 
cases. As such, the adoption of a justice ethic re ects a move away from a 
broad ethical standard that is informed by notions of neutral partisanship 
and zealous advocacy as the lawyer’s primary duties. Notions of neutral 
partisanship and zealous advocacy are, at a minimum, not easy to apply in 
the context of certain government lawyers and more seriously, may have 
grave effects on those citizens subject to government lawyers who adopt 
such an approach.
One of the bene ts of expanding a justice-seeking ethic among a 
broader range of government lawyers is that it has already been subject to 
de nition within the context of adversarial proceedings. Thus, the concept 
is more than an aspirational objective; it has infused and, in turn, altered the 
role of speci c government lawyers within a particular practice context, 
namely crown prosecutors. One such example of this has played out in 
the context of the crown prosecutor’s disclosure obligations; an example 
that is particularly relevant in the context of St. Anne’s. In Stinchcombe, 
Justice Sopinka stated that, “the fruits of the investigation which are in [the 
crown’s] possession are not the property of the Crown for use in securing a 
conviction, but the property of the public to be used to ensure that justice is 
done.”135 This decision had, in part, been in uenced by the  ndings of The 
Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall Jr. Prosecution, which had 
determined that the Crown’s failure to disclose certain statements to the 
135. Stinchcombe, supra note 42.
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defence was a contributing factor in the miscarriage of justice that resulted 
when Donald Marshall was convicted of murder.136 As a consequence of 
Stinchcombe, there is an obligation on crown prosecutors to disclose all 
relevant information including evidence that might prove to be exculpatory 
for the defence.
This does not mean that there is a comprehensive framework. But, 
unlike other ethical articulations, there is at least a starting point for 
 eshing out this ethical approach in more concrete terms. Thus, in certain 
legal contexts (e.g., claims as against the government and matters like the 
IRSSA), a justice-seeking ethic could assist government lawyers in better 
achieving their commitment to the public interest. In so doing, it might 
improve the public’s perceptions of the role of the government lawyer 
who more often than not becomes the ‘face’ of government in high pro le 
cases.137 Moreover, an expanded justice ethic can provide the individual 
government lawyer with a better structural framework in which to operate. 
This is in contrast to the private law zealous advocate framework, which 
fails to account adequately for the unique duties and interests required of 
government lawyers and the needs of the citizens–litigants. 
2. Criticisms of a justice ethic
While there are bene ts to expanding the notion of a justice ethic beyond 
the strictly prosecutorial context, it is necessary to address certain 
criticisms associated with adopting such an approach. One of the most 
compelling critiques involves the concern that, without signi cant 
corresponding structural and regulatory reform, a justice ethic remains 
largely philosophical. At best, justice is a “contested concept” such 
that “working out the meaning of justice, and thus the content of the 
prosecutor’s duty to seek justice, requires one assign weights or priorities 
to different components of justice, such as security, respect for dignity, 
freedom from arbitrary harassment, and protection of rights. Others may 
assign different weights or priorities however.”138 In short, its scope is 
subject to indeterminate application or manipulation. Thus, subjective 
interpretations of what constitutes ‘justice’ within a case may allow a 
government lawyer to justify conduct that is anything but ethical. This 
is further complicated by the fact that, on a regular basis, prosecutors 
136. The Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr. Prosecution: Digest of Findings and 
Recommendations (Halifax: The Commission, 1989).
137. An interesting example of this is the case of St. Anne’s in which the public’s perceptions of the 
federal government’s commitment to reconciliation are played out in the negative publicity associated 
with certain of the legal steps taken by the government lawyers involved in the IAP and related 
litigation on St. Anne’s.
138. Wendel, supra note 40 at 160.
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exercise discretion that requires an analysis and balancing of competing 
values that underscore conceptions of justice; an analysis that may not 
be thoroughly undertaken by the courts when called upon to review a 
prosecutor’s conduct.139 
Moreover, as an aspirational objective that is meant to inform actual 
procedures and processes, it is not consistently enforced or enforceable.140
In addition to being open to interpretation and, more troublingly, 
manipulation, the vagueness of the term ‘justice’ raises dif cult theoretical 
and philosophical questions about differing conceptual bases for justice 
as a guiding principle. In considering the principle of ‘justice’ that is to 
inform ethical legal decision-making and practice, are government lawyers 
to consider a procedural form of justice that leaves outcomes out of the 
conversation or a substantive concept of justice that potentially treads on 
government policy?141 As a consequence, even when government lawyers 
are attempting to ‘seek justice,’ it could mean different things to different 
lawyers in different contexts. 
These interpretive challenges are further complicated by the dual role 
played by government lawyers as both public employees and advocates 
and by a further question about the implications of a civil versus criminal 
context for government lawyers. While there is a clearer understanding 
of the consequences associated with government lawyers failing to seek 
justice in the criminal context (i.e., the potential loss of an individual’s 
liberty), the analysis becomes somewhat murkier in the civil context. In 
the civil context, the dispute is often grounded in questions of tortious 
or contractual liability and the resulting scope of compensation to an 
aggrieved party. An argument might be made that these types of disputes 
do not approach the level of consequence like that of the criminal context. 
However, it is possible to consider a variety of civil contexts in which 
the actions of the state may have a “serious and profound effect” on an 
individual’s life.142 As a consequence, in these particular civil contexts, the 
government’s legal representatives could be subject to a different standard 
of conduct. In contrasting government lawyers’ conduct in a criminal 
context with conduct in a civil context, the question becomes whether a 
citizen is “less entitled to this standard of fairness and evenhandedness 
because the matter does not involve criminal proceedings against him 
139. Alice Woolley, “Reconceiving the Standard Conception of the Prosecutor’s Role” (2017) 95:3 
Can Bar Rev 795 at 820-822.
140. Soubise & Woolley, supra note 2 at 4, 9, 13.
141. Stuart Hampshire, Justice is Con ict (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000).
142. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v G (J), [1999] 3 SCR 46 at para 
49, 177 DLR (4th) 124.
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or her?”143 The IRSSA and the IAP provide concrete examples of non-
criminal proceedings that would bene t from the application of a justice 
ethic. 
A  nal criticism that is important to address in the context of a 
justice ethic involves the fact that, while government lawyers may adopt 
such an ethic, the private lawyers against whom they are acting may 
continue to conduct themselves in accordance with the traditional model 
of professionalism. In such circumstances, even government lawyers 
attempting to adhere to a justice framework may be tempted to ‘ ght  re 
with  re.’ Moreover, are we asking only a certain group of lawyers, namely 
government lawyers, to pledge allegiance to competing duties— justice and 
a corresponding disinterested search for the truth and zealous advocacy?144
Two considerations might be raised in reply. First, just because it is dif cult 
to articulate a standard does not mean it is not a worthy undertaking. In 
fact, seeking justice is and should remain one of the core tenets of the legal 
profession. And second, by engaging in a discussion about the nature of a 
justice ethic that results in a clearer articulation of objectives and concrete 
guidelines, government lawyers operating in the civil context would be 
able to respond to such pressures and conduct themselves accordingly. 
Thus, to do ‘justice,’ it is imperative that a series of more de nitive 
principles and rules be created that will guide lawyers’ conduct in particular 
legal contexts.145 While, in the context of crown prosecutor’s existing 
duties, many of the concrete expressions of the crown’s duties have been 
articulated by the courts, it does not mean the courts can or should carry all 
of the burden of developing an ethical framework for government lawyers. 
In fact, it is worth noting that the courts’ work in this regard has also been 
tempered by a broad degree of discretion that courts bestow on crown 
prosecutors in their practice. Justice L’Heureux-Dube has suggested that 
for the criminal justice system to work well, the Crown must possess a fair 
deal of discretion extending to all aspects of the trial process.146 Moreover, 
as the litigation involving the IAP processes under the IRSSA has 
demonstrated, courts across the country have struggled to de ne the scope 
of their review of the government’s responsibilities in the process.147 For 
example in Attorney General of Canada v JW and Reo Law Corporation, 
the Attorney General took the position that the supervisory judges under 
143. Cotter, “Evolving ‘Public Interest,’” supra note 2 at 160-161.
144. Woolley, supra note 133 at 825.
145. Berenson, supra note 16 at 45.
146. R v Cook, [1997] 1 SCR 1113, 146 DLR (4th) 437.
147. JW Appeal, supra note 67 at paras 27-30. This case has recently been considered by the SCC, see 
JW SCC, supra note 64.
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the IRSSA have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal of or judicially review a 
decision of an adjudicator under the IAP–except in exceptional cases. The 
supervisory court’s ability to review decisions of an adjudicator is limited 
to a correctness standard. Essentially, the government argued that there 
are no procedural protections afforded to the claimants outside the terms 
articulated in the IRRSA.148 These arguments underscore the concern that 
judicial review of IAP adjudicators’ decisions would ultimately impact 
and extend the completion of the process.149 The further consequence is 
that supervisory judges are meant to defer to the adjudicative process and 
by extension, not oversee the government lawyers’ conduct.
In light of these criticisms, a better approach would engage the 
provincial law societies as well as the Federation of Law Societies 
in drafting more guidelines for government lawyers. As it stands, the 
provincial professional codes have taken small steps to carve out and 
articulate speci c rules and directives for prosecutors.150 As an example, 
the commentary under Rule 5.1-3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
in Ontario state that the prosecutor’s “prime duty is not to seek to convict 
but to see that justice is done through a fair trial on the merits.”151 This 
responsibility expressly extends to the crown’s disclosure obligations. 
Arguably, similar language could be added within this commentary or 
in respect of a separate rule or sub-rule to include government lawyers 
practicing outside the criminal prosecutorial context. For instance, as a 
starting point, the Model Code of Professional Conduct might include 
language that states, 
(1) When acting on behalf of the Crown in adversarial proceedings, a 
lawyer must act fairly and dispassionately to ensure that justice is done.
(2) In seeing that justice is done in court proceedings as well as 
proceedings before boards, administrative tribunals, arbitrators and other 
forms of adjudication, a lawyer acting on behalf of the Crown engaged 
in adversarial proceedings must fairly assist the tribunal to arrive at the 
truth, must seek impartially to have the whole of the relevant evidence 
placed fairly before the tribunal, and must seek to assist the tribunal with 
adequate submissions of law that enable the law to be properly applied 
148. JW Appeal, supra note 67.
149. Ibid at paras 21, 31.
150. Law Society of Ontario, supra note 8.
151. Ibid.
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to the facts.152
While this rule attempts to cover signi cant ground in terms of the scope 
of the government lawyer’s duty, it could ultimately be parceled out into 
several sub-rules and commentary that attempt to capture certain aspects 
of a justice framework. Namely, the rules would need to encapsulate 
the type of lawyer subject to the rule, the nature of the legal setting in 
which the lawyer was operating and the scope of her duties within that 
setting. Once the general principle underscoring the justice framework is 
established, additional rules that re ect other concrete aspects of the crown 
prosecutor’s duties to seek justice might be added to the rule and extended 
to apply to government lawyers outside the realm of crown prosecutors. 
The Directive on Civil Litigation Involving Indigenous Peoples could assist 
in establishing a coherent set of rules consistent with a ‘justice’ ethic. 
In developing such rules, it would be helpful to draw on David Wilkins’ 
suggestion regarding the need for and creation of practice-speci c rules. 
His ‘mid-level’ rules take account of both the legal realism associated 
with the practice of law in particular contexts as well as an overarching 
commitment to the systemic values that are chosen to infuse all practice 
spheres.153 In creating mid-level rules that are more attuned to particular 
practice contexts, it is important to consider the speci c legal task, the legal 
subject matter, the status of the player (plaintiff or defendant), the type of 
lawyer and the nature of the client.154 Within the context of government 
lawyers, the relevant factors that would serve to de ne both the scope 
and content of mid-level rules are multi-focused—the articular legal task 
at hand, assuming that the steps of civil litigation might be further sub-
divided; the subject matter (important in delineating the overall types of 
matters that would be subject to a justice ethic); and the status of the lawyer 
(in this case, to a lesser extent whether the government lawyer is acting as 
plaintiff or defendant). All these factors would together set parameters on 
what ‘seeking justice’ looks like in more particular legal contexts. 
Consistent with the creation of even more speci c mid-level rules that 
articulate particular duties and responsibilities within a speci c practice 
152. As a basis for this rule, see New South Wales Government, Law Profession Uniform Conduct 
(Barristers) Rules 2015, online: <www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/regulation/2015/243/
partadvocacyru/rule83> [perma.cc/H2YL-YDLK] at Rule 83, which has been altered and expanded 
for the purposes of this discussion. See also Law Society of Alberta, Code of Conduct, Rule 12 
respecting the clari cation that a “client of a lawyer employed by the government is the government 
itself and not a Board, Agency, Minister or Crown Corporation”; See also Wendel, supra note 40 at 
160.
153. Wilkins, supra note 49 at 515.
154. Ibid at 517.
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setting, it is important that work be done to identify better when a justice-
seeking ethic would arise in legal problems that government lawyers face 
in their daily sphere of practice. By more speci cally addressing those 
problems, government lawyers are not left to interpret how a contested and 
philosophical concept of justice applies. Rather, it should be considered 
how it is best operationalized in a particular setting given certain guidelines 
and expectations. Again, the drafters of these rules could draw on the 
government’s own directive respecting civil litigation with Indigenous 
Peoples. While the development of a justice ethic and accompanying rules 
is meant to extend beyond litigation involving Indigenous Peoples, the 
language and substance of those particular principles would be applicable 
in a broader context and in respect of any litigation as between the Crown 
and an Indigenous group. Moreover, incorporating elements of the federal 
government’s directive within newly drafted professional rules can ensure 
that the rules apply across Canada and in respect of both federal and 
provincial government lawyers. 
In the context of St. Anne’s, an enhanced disclosure requirement that 
included production of the inculpatory as well as exculpatory information 
would have dramatically changed the dynamic of the IAP process both in 
terms of administration of the process and perceptions about fairness of 
the process. If the government lawyers’ conduct had been infused with 
a justice-seeking ethic, they would have been required to produce all 
relevant information: the OPP  les would have been produced and there 
would likely not have been a need for multiple litigious RFD’s as well 
as multiple narratives over the span of seven years. More importantly, 
claimants who had suffered signi cant and traumatic abuse at St. Anne’s 
would not have been denied their claims or forced to recount extremely 
painful stories in an effort to prove claims originally denied due to a lack 
of disclosure. There would have been a different perception of the role of 
the government and its lawyers in the process. This latter consideration 
cannot be downplayed in the context of reconciliation. 
Taking the disclosure example in St. Anne’s IAP process further, 
the production of all relevant information pursuant to a justice-seeking 
ethical obligation is consistent with a commitment to  nding the truth 
rather than defeating a claim. It is in keeping with the government’s 
professed commitment to reconciliation. An ethical approach to practice 
that requires government lawyers to seek justice would also cause those 
same government lawyers to ask themselves what would constitute justice 
in a given case. And, in the case of the government lawyer receiving 
instructions from or providing advice to a government department as 
“client,” a formalized professional duty to promote justice would likely 
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require that the individual lawyer engage in a dialogue about justice 
with that instructing department. Certainly in the case of St. Anne’s, if 
the government lawyers contemplated how justice might be affected in 
the circumstances, it is not likely that seeking justice would entail the 
withholding of information from abuse victims, long drawn out procedural 
battles or the requirement that victims of abuse be required to tell and re-
tell their story in order to obtain compensation.
While this paper has focused on the example of disclosure, a justice 
approach would extend beyond disclosure requirements. For instance, the 
crown’s responsibility to seek justice also extends to the manner in which 
it presents evidence in a criminal proceeding.155 Speci cally, in keeping 
with an obligation to secure just results, the crown prosecutor is “not 
at liberty to curate the evidence [at trial], excising anything that might 
be exculpatory. To do so is to place too high a premium on ‘winning.’ 
It is to lose sight of the Crown’s primary duty to present the case fairly 
and in a manner that will secure a just result.”156 Thus, in extending the 
underlying justice principle to litigation outside the criminal context, we 
could explore how the responsibility to seek justice would inform different 
aspects of the litigation process from pre-trial and preliminary procedural 
matters through to the completion of a trial and beyond—particularly as it 
relates to the appropriateness of an appeal.
While the impact on some of the aspects of civil litigation can be 
imported from the criminal context, some will need to be constituted 
anew. For instance, in learning from the lessons provided in the case of St. 
Anne’s, it would be important to import a justice ethic into the government’s 
decision to proceed with certain procedural steps within a proceeding as 
well as the position taken by the government in the course of procedural 
motions. Infusing procedural motions with a justice ethic would attempt to 
ensure that government lawyers are pursuing procedural orders that are just 
and responding to procedural motions of opposing parties with positions 
that re ect a commitment to obtaining a just result overall. Again, in these 
circumstances, it is and would be incumbent on government lawyers to 
act in accordance with a justice ethic notwithstanding any action taken by 
opposing parties and private lawyers who continue to act in a traditionally 
adversarial manner. While ultimately the goal is to ensure that all lawyering 
is infused with a justice ethic, the purpose of this paper is to ensure 
that the focus remains on the steps and positions taken by government 
lawyers. Thus, when initiating procedural motions as well as responding 
155. R v Ahmed, 2015 ONCA 751; R v Hillis, 2016 ONSC 451 [Hillas].
156. Hillas, supra note 155 at para 24.
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to procedural motions brought by opposing counsel, government lawyers 
should ask whether the positions they adopt contribute to the fair and just 
resolution of the litigation rather than winning a motion at all costs.157
Such an inquiry might prevent the adoption of positions that serve to delay 
and obfuscate proceedings.158 
For instance, the government’s position regarding the limited 
supervisory role of the courts in the IRSSA may serve an argument of 
 nality and certainty often made in litigation processes but again, these are 
not purely litigious processes. Alternatively, adopting a justice ethic in this 
circumstance might require that government lawyers balance the need for 
 nality, as an adversarial objective, with the promotion of reconciliation, 
the voice of survivors and recompense of abuse of all victims of 
residential schools. In another example, maintaining arguments about the 
interpretation of the term ‘resident’ for the purpose of denying a minor’s 
sexual assault claim might also be better served by a justice analysis.159
In that case, a claimant had remained in a guardianship relationship at 
the school after  nishing her schooling because her family could not 
care for her at home. While in a guardian relationship at the school, she 
earned room and board, but was sexually assaulted by an adult employee 
of the residential school on school grounds. Government counsel took the 
position that, as she was paid by the school (essentially earning her room 
and board), she was not a student nor a resident, but rather an employee. 
As an employee, it was argued that she was not entitled to compensation 
under the terms of the IRSSA. However, suggesting that a minor and former 
student who was sexually assaulted at the school by an adult employee is 
not entitled to compensation raises cause for concern in that it relies on a 
technical and narrow interpretation of the terms of IRRSA; the goal being 
the limiting of claims rather than redress for victims.160 Again, in such a 
case, pursuing justice may check the use of interpretive arguments that 
serve to limit legitimate payable claims at the expense of other objectives 
that the government is pursuing including, “right[ing] the wrongs that 
157. It is the assertion of the independent counsel involved in St. Anne’s that the government 
maintained positions respecting the applicability of settlement privilege and/or deemed undertakings 
that had little or legal basis (no legal authority or evidence of the examinations being for the purpose 
of settlement) and that such was acknowledged by the government in the course of the proceedings. 
See Fontaine Cost Submissions, supra note 92 at para 44.
158. See reference to the government position that there is no right to procedural fairness in IRSSA 
and no right of appeal from the decision of the Chief Adjudicator: Fontaine MBQB, supra note 104.
159. Ibid at paras 41-44.
160. Ibid.
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were committed against to whom it [Canada] was in the relationship of a 
caregiver.”161 
Conclusion
The delineation of appropriate ethical conduct based on a justice-seeking 
ethic disabuses government lawyers of a commitment to a private 
law adversarial approach to civil litigation. Moreover, by assessing 
objectives through a justice lens, a more ethically sustainable approach to 
professionalism that moves beyond a commitment to neutral partisanship 
and is more re ective of the government’s duty to its citizenry more 
broadly is developed.162 This approach needs to be supplemented by and 
be directed by a corresponding set of practical rules that take account 
of the operationalization of justice ethic in daily practice and different 
settings. While there remains much work to do in putting  esh on the 
bones of this ethical approach, the acknowledgement that a new approach 
is needed is a start. This is particularly so in circumstances like St. Anne’s. 
In many ways, a  rst step has been taken by former Attorney General 
Wilson-Raybould. She recognized the need for a new approach to the 
government’s engagement in litigation with Indigenous groups. This 
would be an excellent place to begin a much deeper and broader debate on 
the professional and ethical responsibilities of government lawyers.
161. Ibid at para 65.
162. Trevor CW Farrow, “Sustainable Professionalism” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 51.
